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INTRODUCTION 
I. OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVES 
This is a study designed to understand the development of an 
organization called the Coalition to Restore Coastal 
Louisiana (the Coalition). The Coalition's aim is to stop 
the literal sinking of much of coastal Louisiana through 
changes in government policy toward wetland use. Since 1988 
when the Coalition incorporated, it has focused increased 
public attention on Louisiana's wetlands that are turning 
into open water and shrinking the state's geography. 
Thousands of people live directly on or are protected by the 
coastal wetlands raising the possibility of inundation for 
coastal communities. The Coalition raised questions about 
how government water policy toward the Mississippi delta 
promoted the wetland's decline, and the Coalition has 
offered alternate solutions including legislation that may 
protect homes and preserve other important values of coastal 
wetlands. Since the Coalition began, its members have 
engaged in wetland advocacy. Coalition people attend 
legislative hearings, conduct public education, and publish 
information on the status of Louisiana's coast. 
The actual means by which the organization itself arose 
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remains an unanswered question however, and highlights a gap 
in the study of political organizations. The gap is a lack 
of consensus on the reasons for political group formation in 
the study of interest group behavior. One line of thought 
has held that the American political system is permeable, 
that is, when a need arises like coastal wetland loss and 
enough people are concerned about it, then a group will form 
to represent people who have in common the wish to see the 
policy changed (Truman, 1951). Still another line stresses 
the difficulty in establishing representative groups like 
the Coalition since they advocate for a collective good -- a 
better environment through sustained coastal wetlands --
something potential supporters will obtain whether they join 
or not (Olson, 1965, 1982). Like other public interest 
organizations, the Coalition had to acquire resources by 
relying on people committed to a cause and organizational 
patrons. 
Yet the Coalition is a successful organization. It has 
attracted and retained patrons interested in the wetlands 
cause. It has a paid staff, a budget and offices from which 
it prints and issues publications and conducts lobbying 
activities around Louisiana and Washington, D.C. An 
extensive literature on interest groups provides general 
insight on group structure, goals, number, distribution and 
political behavior of similar groups, yet that scholarship 
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has not provided much guidance concerning how non profit 
political groups become established operating organizations 
(Berry, 1977, 1989, Walker, 1992). The actual mechanics of 
making an organization and sustaining it in a social 
movement such as the environmental movement remains elusive. 
Compounding the gap in the interest group building 
literature is the low level of studies on state level 
interest organizations and a lack of information concerning 
ties to state governments and national environmental 
organizations (See for instance Moe, 1980 p. 262). The 
majority of research on interest group activity --
theoretical models, case studies on particular groups and 
survey research -- has been conducted largely on national 
level organizations (Thomas and Hrebner, 1992). Existing 
research has illuminated aspects of how national interest 
groups behave, but it still leaves open questions about how 
state and regional interest groups happen in the 
environmental movement, that is, clear information on their 
development. Studies of state level interest groups suggest 
that they may be of even more policy importance than 
national organizations (Ziegler, 1983, Gray and Lowery, 
1995). And, now that the federal government is again poised 
to remand power back to the states, it is crucial to 
understand state level environmental organization in 
ecosystems of national importance like the Lower Mississippi 
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Alluvial Plain. The Lower Mississippi is a crucial economic 
and biological resource for the United States more fully 
described later. 
The aim of this work is to penetrate the Coalition using 
qualitative field research to show how it developed. The 
study argues that the Coalition obtained and employed 
resources successfully while not relying solely on mass 
appeal for membership support. Coalition entrepreneurs are 
good business persons who observed a common interest in 
tying aggregate group and individual interests into a 
functioning political organization to sustain the wetlands. 
What is unclear is how this happened. studying the 
Coalition's development is an opportunity to improve the 
understanding of how an interest group can form from social 
movements by clarifying what the incentives for organization 
were. This work shows how the Coalition capitalized on the 
incentives. 
The first goal of this study is the description of the 
Coalition supporters and their agendas to discern incentives 
for mobilization. Non profit public interest groups 
litigating, setting public agendas and influencing 
legislation is not news to interest group scholarship, but 
the incentives and the strategies of non profit 
organizational development for political ends need to be 
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better understood. This case study provides the opportunity 
for in depth assessment of these factors. 
The second goal of this work is to use a broader unit of 
analysis to study the Coalition than has been the case with 
previous interest group case studies. Previous research 
frequently relied on individual members .and their decisions 
to join as the unit of analysis, that is, the basis for 
predicting whether a group will form. Even the character of 
the group and its political activity are frequently viewed 
through the window of the individual it represents and how 
many individuals it counts as members. Rather than seeking 
only the selective benefits available to potential 
individual members to join the group, this study g,oes a step 
further by examining the incentives of the parent 
organizations allied behind the new organi.zation, besides 
the incentives and behavior of the entrepreneurs. Through 
field research the study identifies strategic incentives in 
a fashion resembling Hula's (1994) approach to understanding 
national interest group coalitions. Using a broader unit of 
analysis stems from recent survey research used by Walker 
that relied on resource mobilization theory as it has been 
applied to study of social movement organizations (SMO's) 
(Gamson, 1975, McCarthy and Zald, 1978, Walker, 1992). 
This study's thesis is that building the organization is 
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linked to benefits and strategies of a few entrepreneurs who 
represented parent organizations that promoted group 
alliance formation. The entrepreneurs' efforts, captured in 
field interviews, documents, and participant observation 
identify the incentives and how they moved the proponents of 
the Coalition toward an established incorporated 
organization lending support to a resource mobilization 
approach to the study. (McCarthy and Zald., 1977, see Walker 
et al., 1992). The Coalition did not happen spontaneously or 
because of an eruption of concern for a good idea --
restoring Louisiana's coastal wetlands. Entrepreneurs 
created an organization using the wetland theme but also 
used foundation patrons, church groups and others. Rival 
hypotheses for the Coalition's development are examined in 
the conclusion of this work and are compared to resource 
mobilization theory discussed in the literature review. 
SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES: 
The objectives of this study are to describe the Coalition 
as a product of entrepreneurship that key:ed on promoting the 
selective and strategic benefits available to members and 
parent organizations and contrast this case against other 
rival theories of group formation. Specifically, 
1) the study places the Coalition in a context of study 
of emerging organizations in the environmental 
movement, 
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2) it will show that the Coalition formed for reasons 
beyond the frequently used unit of analysis "individual 
decision to join" and emphasize the importance of 
parent organizational members of the Coalition and 
their strategic incentives to form and maintain the 
organization, 
3) it will identify the individual selective benefits 
and strategic incentives of the individual and 
organizational components and, 
4) it will explain how Coalition entrepreneurs used the 
selective benefits and incentives to build the 
organization. 
WHAT THE STUDY IS NOT: 
This work is not a study of lobbying or of the Coalition's 
impact on public policies, although the Coalition seeks to 
persuade government to adopt pro-wetland policies. The 
Coalition claims success in lobbying at the state and 
federal level and there is compelling anecdotal evidence 
that to a degree the Coalition moved the state and federal 
governments to change their wetland policies. However, the 
demonstration of policy change or impact by an interest 
group is a related but clearly different research endeavor. 
Instead of looking at what the organization does or intends 
to do per se, the study focuses on the Coalition's 
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organizational development history from 1985 to 1992. The 
focus is how this group manifested to enter the political 
system. When lobbying activities are discussed in the study 
they are used to illustrate the incentives that lead to the 
group's formation. The data collected in coastal Louisiana 
show what factors were important in forming the Coalition in 
terms of the needs of the parent organizations. 
Fieldwork interviews and other sources have provided 
sufficient information to examine research questions about 
the development of the Coalition. An abbreviated 
illustrative history of the Coalition follows, then two 
research questions about the Coalition are presented and the 
introduction then ends by explaining the strategy for the 
rest of this work. 
II. THE COALITION TO RESTORE COASTAL LOUISIANA: A BRIEF 
DESCRIPTION 
The Coalition is a mixture of people and organizations that 
became a 501 (c) 3 not for profit Louisiana corporation in 
1988. National and local lawyers who represent the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the local Sierra Club 
chapter formed the initial instigating group and drew in 
collaborators. They drew in academically based ecologists, a 
group of scientists whose research had documented 
catastrophic change in the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plain 
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to help them in developing their court cases in order to 
expand the wetlands' section of the Clean Water Act. The 
ecologists were brought in as partners and formed an 
informal association that continued after the Clean Water 
Act litigation in the seventies. 
Local church groups whose fishermen and shrimper 
parishioners suffered from the change in coastal land forms 
(synonymous with wetland change), have a special 
relationship with the lawyers who represented their 
interests in keeping bayou fishing areas open for their 
livelihood. These church clients were brought in as the 
beginning of a grassroots connection for the Coalition. The 
fishing areas were closed off because of wetland decline and 
large companies subsequently asserting new property rights 
that excluded local fishermen. The local attorney who worked 
with national lawyers had represented their wetland access 
claim in court. 
A network of local environmental organizations was brought 
in that includes the Louisiana Wildlife Federation, and 
environmentally active persons in the state capital of Baton 
Rouge. They comprise another circle of persons who had 
interests in the coastal wetlands. State environmental and 
natural resource bureaucrats helped the Coalition and have 
attended meetings, giving varying degrees of support to an 
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organization that was arguing for their policies to change 
and also increasing their budgets. 
Each component group had an ongoing interest in the physical 
problem of Louisiana coastal wetlands years before the 
creation of the Coalition and each played a crucial role in 
the development of the organization. The relationship 
between the lawyers, LSU ecologists, local fisherman 
associated with Catholic Social Services and the state 
capital network was the raw material of formal organization. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYERS AND SCIENTISTS 
The benchmark for the organization occurred in October, 1985 
at a symposium at Louisiana State University (LSU) in Baton 
Rouge, where James T.B. Tripp, General Counsel for the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) in New York City called for 
the creation of an organization to sustain Louisiana's 
sinking wetlands. Tripp had been invited to the symposium by 
a member of the ecology faculty at LSU, John W. Day Jr., who 
had provided the technical expertise for some Louisiana 
wetland cases that Tripp had litigated for EDF in the US 
Fifth Circuit Court in New Orleans. Tripp's statement was 
the first public call for the creation of the Coalition and 
provided an organizational springboard for LSU scientists, 
local attorneys and national environmental groups that had 
been developing over 15 years. 
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Like other members of the big ten (environmental groups 
cooperating since 1980: EDF, NRDC, NWF, Izaak Walton, Sierra 
Club, Friends of the Earth, Environmental Action, Audubon 
Society, Greenpeace, Wilderness Society, See Ingram and 
Mann, 1989 p.146), part of EDF strategy is to litigate 
carefully chosen cases in important ecosystems to further 
define the 1970's environmental laws such as the Clean Water 
Act. The statutes have ambiguous sections such as the Clean 
Water Act's definition of wetlands. Wetlands are not 
mentioned at all in the act, but groups like EDF have 
continually asserted in the courts that they are covered 
under the acts language of "waters of the United States" and 
should be protected under the Corps' Clean Water Act 
(Section 404) permit system. 
Tripp and other national lawyers like Oliver Houck of the 
National Wildlife Federation had commuted to Louisiana's 
vast swamplands and marshes for years focusing their case 
objectives on the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plain. The 
national lawyers worked through New Orleans attorney Michael 
Osborne, who was also at th.e LSU symposium and had also 
received technical advise from John Day. Osborne's practice 
included work for the local Sierra Club chapter that he 
belonged to and he was well acquainted with the local 
judiciary particularly the us Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
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The implications for Louisiana are significant because close 
to 25% of the total land area of Louisiana is classified by 
the federal government as wetland area (Dahl, 1990). Also 
between 65 and 70% of the entire state population lives 
within fifty miles of the coast. Most, including the New 
Orleans metropolitan area, are very close to protective 
coastal wetlands (Craig, et al, 1979, Coalition to Restore 
Coastal Louisiana, 1989). Many homes are situated directly 
on the wetlands areas either suspended by pilings above the 
marsh or on eroding chenier beaches in southwest Louisiana. 
Because New Orleans is below sea level it is especially 
vulnerable to coastal land loss when faced by hurricanes. 
For instance, hurricane Camille in 1969 barely touched the 
area but generated a twenty foot tidal surge that killed 
many persons south of New Orleans (Davis, 1990). The less 
land available to break up the erosive power of the Gulf 
exposes cities like New Orleans, and Lake Charles to 
inundation. Small rural communities like Cocodrie in 
Terrebonne Parish face sinking as well. Coastal Louisiana is 
home to millions of people, much of the commercial 
navigation traffic of the country, 40% of the shell and fin 
fishery of America and wildlife refuges like Sabine 
Lacassine and Rockefeller noted for their biological 
diversity (Craig et al., 1979, Coalition to Restore Coastal 
Louisiana, 1989}. 
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Also in the early seventies Oliver Houck, now a Professor of 
Law at Tulane, commuted to New Orleans on an almost monthly 
basis from Washington, D.C. to help preserve the Atchafalaya 
swamp from the Old River Control Structure on the 
Mississippi to Morgan City on the Gulf. As cofounder and 
General Counsel of the National Wildlife Federation's legal 
arm in Washington, D.C., Houck concentrated on protecting 
the Atchafalaya swamp as he searched for cases throughout 
the country to help establish NWF's legal arm in many 
states. Houck also worked with Osborne and wrote one of the 
first major policy assessments of the declining coastal 
wetlands in the Tulane Law Review and other important 
contributions (Houck, 1983, 1988). 
As the lawyers developed their interests in coastal 
Louisiana throughout this time, academic scientists pursued 
extensive new research on the declining Louisiana wetlands 
some of which was based on funding that some of them helped 
secure through the Louisiana legislature. Between LSU, 
Tulane and the Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium 
(LUMCON) in Cocodrie, Louisiana, the academic scientists 
evolved into a loose wetland ecology group consisting of 
geologists, marine biologists, wildlife ecologists and 
others; one of them, a physical chemist, later became 
Louisiana Secretary of Environmental Quality when the 
Coalition organized. Some like John w. Day Jr., were sought 
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out by the lawyers and through extensive collaboration 
provided the them with technical expertise for lawsuits. The 
scientists sought interest and research funding to continue 
their discoveries concerning how the ecology of the 
Mississippi delta works. 
1985 to 1988: THE COALITION AT OSBORNE'S LAW OFFICE. 
Tripp met in Osborne's law office throughout 1986-87 along 
with the LSU ecology faculty and others whom Osborne 
selected through his knowledge of Louisiana environmental 
activists. Osborne invited people to the meetings whom he 
knew from his membership in the Sierra Club, associates and 
certain clients whom he had represented in environmentally 
related cases. Lawyers in the New Orleans area including 
Houck of Tulane were present, members of the Sierra Club 
C Chapter including the Schoefflers who were active in the 
Lafayette United Methodist Church, and Rob Gorman from the 
Houma Thibodaux Cath.olic Diocese Social service office in 
Terrebonne Parish .( a parish that could be submerged within 
fifty years)(Coalition to restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). 
The informal group was the nascent Coalition; it totaled 
about f i.fteen people and continued to meet in Osborne's 
office. 
Houck set about the process of incorporation with the state 
of Louisiana and the Coalition became a 501 (c) 3 trust 
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organization. By December 1987, the incorporation papers had 
been filed and the IRS tax statement was being processed 
which would allow tax exempt contributions to help sustain 
the organization's staff and activities. At the end of this 
time the Coalition formulated its manifesto: "Coastal 
Louisiana, Here Today And Gone Tomorrow?: A Citizens Program 
for saving the Mississippi River Delta Region, To Protect 
Its Heritage, Economy and Environment." (Hereafter called 
"Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?") "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" 
generated over eighteen recommendations to alter public 
policy at the state and federal level. The recommendations 
included engineering changes based on ecological research 
and specific legal and administrative changes in the federal 
and state policies concerning wetlands. 
The Coalition secured office space in Baton Rouge in an 
unoccupied office building, the Lamar Building, cost free 
for the first year. Foundation support grew to approximately 
$100,000 to $200,000 per year for the Coalition's budget 
from national foundations such as w. Alton Jones, Mary 
Babcock and The Rockefeller Family Trust. Eventually the 
Lamar company needed the building back and the Coalition 
obtained office space in a small plaza on Highland Road in 
Baton Rouge. In 1988 the Coalition hired a community 
organizer and a secretary and began to issue publications 
and hold additional meetings. To bring attention to the land 
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loss issue the Coalition sponsored a concert, a booth at the 
1988 Republican National Convention in New Orleans and a 
series of educational programs as well as community meetings 
called the Coast Watch Program. The Coalition sponsored 
legislation at both the state and federal level and began a 
massive grassroots church campaign in the coastal parishes 
to promote legislative change concerning wetlands. 
In 1989 the Coalition claimed it helped push the Louisiana 
Coastal Restoration Act that created a mineral tax on oil 
and gas to help restore coastal wetlands. The legislation 
was voted on later as a Constitutional Amendment that passed 
with over seventy percent support. The legislation also 
created a position in the Governor's office to promote 
coastal restoration and oversee wetland restoration 
functions which had been spread among several departments. 
In 1990 the Coalition claimed it helped pass the National 
Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act 
(PL. 101-646, Title ;tII) helped by Coalition supporter us. 
Senator John Breaux (Breaux, 1990). Breaux wrote a guest 
column in the Coalition newsletter underscoring the 
Coalition's support. Also Coalition member State Senator Ben 
Bagert (R), had secured a letter from George Bush during the 
1988 convention pledging no new "net loss" of wetlands 
(Bagert, 1990). When the field work for this research was 
conducted in 1992 the Coalition had an office staff that 
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included an Executive Director, a Director of Science and 
Technology, and a Publications Editor and continued to rely 
on foundation support for its activities. 
III. STRATEGY OF THIS DISSERTATION 
To understand the crucial factors,associated with the 
organization of the Coalition, this study takes the case 
and scrutinizes how resource mobilization worked in the 
Coalition. The study expands knowledge in two ways. First, 
it describes the Coalition as an interest group that emerged 
in an ecosystem of national importance with help from not 
only individuals but strategic interests of parent 
organizations. This is accomplished by emphasizing more 
complex organization formation than previous interest 
organization building study that relied mostly on individual 
members. 
Second, the work examines two explicitly stated research 
questions about the organization's formation. The conclusion 
of the work matches rival explanations against this case in 
a "strong inference" mode (Platt, 1964, Eckstein, 1975). In 
both biology and political science, advocates of the case 
study method rely on ruling out rival hypotheses or 
extinguishing theories for a particular case under study. 
This study is an empirical inquiry that is more than theory 
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verification. There is a lack of consensus on a unified 
theoretical approach to predicting the formation and 
maintenance of groups that seek largely political goods in 
American society with g.reat implications for group behavior. 
The task here is related but much narrower however and 
familiar to many environmentally conscious people who get 
together to address an environmental concern: how did this 
new interest group form and mobilize in an ecosystem of 
crucial importance to many interests? How can a political 
organization such as the Coalition be built or can it be? 
Did these people just come together and assume they have 
things in common? Or as resource mobilization theory 
suggests was their a series of related incentives that 
brought about the organization called the Coalition to 
Restore Coastal Louisiana? 
Intensive interviews in Coastal Louisiana were conducted 
throughout the spring and summer of 1992 to search for 
incentives and how they might work. Organizational members 
were given a guided but simple and unstructured interview 
format and each asked at different times and locations how 
the organization developed. This afforded the ability to 
find interview data that had sufficient range, depth, 
specificity and personal context to identify the incentives 
(Merton et al, 1957). In addition, several months of 
participant observation yielded data in the marsh area near 
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Cocodrie, the Baton Rouge legislative and academic 
communities, and the New Orleans metropolitan area. In 
addition a Coalition staffer arranged for the investigator 
to attend a seventy-mile ride down the Mississippi River on 
a high water inspection aboard a tug of the us Army Corps of 
Engineers. In a collegial fashion, Coalition staff Dr. Paul 
Kemp and Sheree Ellison allowed the investigator into their 
offices for substantial contact with the staff and Coalition 
associates over the spring and summer of 1992. 
The systematic examination of how the Coalition 
entrepreneurs organized specifies the incentives and 
strategies. The study examines the fallowing hypothes.es: 
RESEARCH QUESTION I. Coalition organizational success is due 
primarily to the resources of organizational members guided 
by entrepreneurs from the Coalitions parent organizations 
rather than merely a mass appeal for support based upon 
potential individual decision to join. 
RESEARCH QUESTION II. Reasons in addition to the loss of 
coastal wetlands provide the selective and strategic 
benefits that help build the Coalition and encompass 
incentives to: expand scientific knowledge through academic 
research grants, solve environmental law disputes that 
expand the federal wetland law, show that national 
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environmental interest groups has grassroots support, 
provide support for state level natural resource division 
bureaucracies, help political careers, and assist state 
level bureaucratic careers. 
The study is divided into four remaining sections. In 
chapter two the literature on interest groups is analyzed 
beginning with the characteristics of group formation that 
are important to the Coalition and the relevant 
environmental movement factors surrounding the background of 
the problem. 
The review of the literature in the next chapter shows the 
approaches to interest group studies that provide clues to 
explaining how the Coalition mobilized. The Coalition is 
seen as an example of a latent group that overcame Olson's 
''free rider" problem by using national foundation money 
guided by the efforts of a few Coalition entrepreneurs 
(Olson, 1965). The beginning of the review provides an 
overview of what is known about interest groups in general. 
Then the review suggests the public interest groups of the 
environmental movement have overcome the free rider problem 
to sustain themselves but insufficient research has been 
conducted to explain how this works. The Coalition then is a 
case study that provides additional information about group 
formation and maintenance where there is abundant 
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theoretical models, abundant survey research on aggregate 
group characteristics, but little empirical in depth field 
work to obtain knowledge about how such groups operate. 
The method described in the third chapter shows how the data 
were gathered to conduct the case study. First the method 
for 11getting in" the organization will be described in 
detail so that the qualitative techniques can be understood 
and reproduced. The investigator gained access to the 
organization by gaining the confidence of Coalition members 
who acted as gatekeepers to interview members. The 
interviews were supplemented by participant observation and 
the acquisition of Coalition documents. 
The results are summarized in four sections: lawyers, their 
organizations and their incentives, ecologists, and their 
incentives, the Grassroots and their incentives and finally 
the State Capital Network. Each section begins with a 
participant discussing the problem and the coalition. Then 
the issues are summarized with more discussion from the 
participants to elaborate on themselves and the problem and 
finally the incentives are summarized. A resource 
mobilization framework in the conclusion is weighed against 
other possibilities given the interview and other data. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
I. OVERVIEW 
Whether an interest group like the Coalition forms and 
enters the American political system depends upon its 
overcoming several hurdles invariably emcountered by 
political organizations (Olson, 1965, 1982, Mitchell, 1979, 
Moe 1980). Political organizations seeking collective goods 
-- goods that every potential member will receive whether 
they join or not -- must overcome obstacles of funding and 
membership support that are unique problems for them (see 
Walker, 1992). A theory that could account for the formation 
and continuance of political organizations, especially 
groups that come from social movements, is still a very 
ambiguous and elusive goal. A goal of this study is to take 
the existing arguments about interest group formation and 
maintenance and compare them to the results obtained from a 
qualitative analysis of the incentives of the Coalition. 
Alternative explanations will be excluded for the case of 
the Coalition, in order to find a more satisfactory 
explanation of its formation and maintenance in the last 
chapter of the study. 
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The elements of interest group formation scholarship span 
several fields representing a vast literature. Economics, 
the social psychology of small groups, organizational 
theories of entrepreneurship, political science, sociology, 
law and now ecological theories of organizational 
development have all tackled the group formation problem for 
organizations that seek collective goods (Olson, 1965, Moe, 
1980, Walker, 1992). If there is any unifying theme among 
these literatures it is only a desire to know how to create 
and continue an organization based mostly on a social cause. 
Unfortunately, viewed as a whole the scholarship on group 
formation has been characterized as showing a lack of 
consensus and the research demonstrates a lack of a uniform 
approach (Jenkins, 1986, Walker, 1992). For instance, Lowery 
and Gray (1992) studied the emergence of state interest 
groups when they become politically active, but some groups 
in their sample may not be organized primarily for 
collective action and represent a business group organized 
primarily for a non collective purpose. Political scientists 
have studied groups in one policy area or studied individual 
groups, but do not always measure the same phenomena. There 
are several incongruent definitions or topologies of 
interest groups that do very little to bring clarity to the 
study of political interests (Walker, et al. 1992). 
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Environmental non governmental organization (NGO) literature 
provides some insight on social organizations, but often 
does not address political questions important to 
understanding the organization's behavior (World Watch 
Institute, 1992, Snow, 1994). The NGO rubric unfortunately 
sheds little light on interest group formation and 
maintenance behavior in terms of why the organizations are 
being supported or how they can obtain support. NGO study by 
environmental scholars should be expanded because there may 
be serious behavioral differences between group types 
depending on how they are defined (Salisbury, 1984). 
Salisbury's analysis of interest groups would enhance 
environmental managers' study of NGOs. Salisbury notes that 
the divide between governmental and non governmental groups 
and business or non business groups may mask different 
behavioral types within these group categories (Salisbury, 
1984). The behavior of several categories of non 
governmental groups such as labor unions, not for profit 
corporations, businesses, coalitions or associations could 
vary widely. 
Snow (1994) surveyed what he calls environmental NGO's to 
understand organizations "inside the Environmental 
movement," and extols a greater emphasis on NGO leadership 
training and planning. Yet Snow gives woefully inadequate 
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attention to political factors such as the incentives, 
motivations and institutional needs of potential patrons. 
Also Snow and others succumb to a "tenor of advocacy" in 
environmental interest organization study, which Ingram and 
Mann (1987) cautioned against in their review of the status 
of interest group behavior scholarship. 
Two general orienting themes however, stand out in interest 
group formation and maintenance scholarship. Truman's 
pluralistic view that political groups happen naturally 
because of the aggregation of persons with like functions 
and responses to "disturbance" and Olson's perspectives that 
rational people will not form for purely collective benefits 
but form for some selective benefit to themselves (Truman, 
1951, Olson, 1965). In the 1970s and 1980's cases studies 
and survey research began to clarify some aspects of where 
groups come from in the American political system, but how 
they manifest is still unclear. The chapter lists possible 
theories for the Coalition. It concludes by suggesting the 
Coalition is an interesting test case of existing theories. 
II. GROUP FORMATION AND THE COLLECTIVE GOODS DILEMMA 
Madison's theory of the Constitution relied on opposite and 
rival interests to balance each other out and maintain a 
balance of power and is regarded as an early group theory 
25 
(Madison, 1789). Voluntary associations have always 
characterized American society since Tocqueville observed 
them in the early nineteenth century and the country 
continues to see new groups forming to better some aspect of 
the national agenda (Tocqueville, 1848, Jenkins, 1986). 
Andrew McFarland's study of Common Cause linked that group 
to a history of reform groups that appear in America 
periodically (McFarland, 1984). 
The systematic study of interest organizations is frequently 
associated with David B. Truman in "The Governmental 
Process", 1951). Groups come together and become "cohesive" 
according to Truman, because as society becomes more complex 
and there is increasing specialization of function, people 
with like functions associate to protect their interests. 
For Truman, it is essential for many interest groups to form 
in society because it promotes political stability when 
people belong to more than one group (Truman, 1951). But 
some scholars have suggested this process is fraught with 
problems for society. For instance, Schattschneider contends 
that the economic bias of groups is unfair; the rich can 
more often than not easily mobilize against others making 
the understanding of interest behavior important social 
inquiry (Schattschneider, 1960). 
No matter what mode of group formation theory one follows 
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the importance of interest groups in society is even more 
important now than at other times in history. For instance, 
there has been a huge proliferation of groups that, 
depending on how the groups are defined, has seen at least a 
threefold increase in Washington, D.C. since World War II 
(Cigler and Loomis, 1994, Walker et al., 1992). Olson has 
viewed the proliferation of interests with alarm suggesting 
among other things that coalitions of interest groups stymie 
economic growth and lead to civil strife (Olson, 1982). 
Truman's theory of interest group formation is a variant of 
the theory of voluntary associations (See Olson for a 
discussion of Truman on this point, 1965). Salisbury has 
noted that Truman's theory is actually a series of partial 
theories or fragments of a theory of group formation 
(Salisbury, 1969). Truman and his critics cite historical 
evidence of group formation and lack of formation to support 
their generalizations. Yet these are only theories, not 
evidence of group behavior that could help explain current 
environmental group formation. 
Recent survey research shows that the universe of American 
interest groups is not uniform and much more complex than 
Truman or Olson envisaged (Berry, 1977, Moe, 1980, Walker, 
1992, Lowery and Gray, 1995). Because of this diversity it 
is difficult to predict why some groups will form and other 
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do not (King and Walker, 1992). Walker et al. 1992 asserts 
that it is easy to und.erstand why large business groups such 
as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), labor 
unions, and agriculture groups form to represent their 
interests. But it is not obvious that a group such as the 
American Railway Passengers Association forms, more people 
ride buses and there is no bus passenger's association 
(Walker et al. 1992). 
Walker asks troubling organizational questions based on his 
extensive samples: How does the railway group keep in 
contact with and derive support from its members? Why is 
there a National Association of Puerto Rican Volunteers? Why 
do people organize for poor children? Why are there 
organizations against the death penalty, most people in 
these organizations do not have relatives on death row and 
the hapless inmates do not have the education or money to 
join. And why for instance, does there exist no national 
body that advocates for the millions of unemployed? The 
small fraction of persons who are union members is a closed 
group and unions do not seek to organize the unemployed. 
Walker does not decry these groups and maintains that they 
are very worthy causes, but how did they get the resources 
to operate, print and mail out literature and pay personnel 
(Walker, et al. 1992)? 
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Olson's 1965 by-product theory changed the field of interest 
group research by describing the collective action dilemma 
that strongly shows why rational people should not organize 
(Olson, 1965). Mancur Olson developed the concepts of 
collective goods and selective incentives in a model that 
challenges Truman's pluralist tradition of easy formation of 
political interest groups. Olson argued that all purely 
political organizations strive for collective goods, the 
example in environmental politics is a better environment or 
in the case of the Coalition sustaining coastal wetlands. 
But a collective good might also be national defense, social 
welfare, or even the Army Corps of Engineer water projects 
along the Mississippi. These are all "collective goods" that 
everyone will obtain if the group's objectives are achieved. 
The question that follows is: why should potential members 
invest the time and money to join if the good will be 
obtained anyway or if the potential member feels that their 
contribution would not help the group (Olson, 1965)? And, if 
enough people do not invest the time and money to build the 
organization's resources, how can any political organization 
happen at all? This is the collective action dilemma. Olson 
holds that persons who will receive a benefit anyway will be 
tempted to "free ride" that is, they will select to be a 
free rider rather than contributing the time and effort 
needed to support group formation and maintenance if they 
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act rationally (Olson, 1965). 
According to Olson, political groups must have another non 
political reason to cause them to form, their political 
activities are a by-product of their organizations' real 
motivating purpose. Unions get power through the legal and 
physical coercion of members to join, farm groups offer 
cheap insurance and group commodity prices that produce 
economies of scale. Or there is a solidary purpose that is 
fraternal in nature. The point is that the organization 
exists for another purpose than the political goal publicly 
sought (Olson, 1965). 
Until the 1960s political scholars took organizational 
formation for granted, if there was some need for 
like-minded people to organize they simply did so (Truman, 
1951). Latham (1952) suggested that this natural coming 
together was the result of some natural group ordering in 
the political or social affairs. But Olson's writings 
demand that any serious scholarship not dismiss the 
collective goods dilemma and show how political 
organizations form. Even if a study supports Truman and 
interest organizations can gain access and permeate the 
political system, how did the organization overcome the 
collective goods dilemma specified by Olson? Clues are 
available from Clark and Wilson's 1962 elaboration of 
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incentives: material, solidary and purposive but 
specification of what and how these incentives work has 
remained too vague (Clarke and Wilson, 1962). 
Empirical inquiries continued in the seventies with case 
studies and survey research that showed the limitations of 
theoretical models based on historical generalizations of 
Truman and Olson (Berry, 1977, Mitchell, 1979, Moe, 1980, 
Walker, 1983, Lowery and Gray, 1995). In particular the 
social unrest of the 1960's highlighted many organizations 
that sought political goals but simply did not fit existing 
mobilization models. 
III. NON PROFIT GROUPS OF THE SEVENTIES CREATE NEW EVIDENCE 
Public interest organizations that developed in the late 
sixties, the shear volume of new groups and an increase in 
attention concerning interest group activity at the state 
level show a greater diversity of group formation phenomena 
that have only continued to frustrate the goal of a unified 
approach to predicting how political interests form 
(Mitchell, 1979, Cigler and Loomis, 1991). In Walker et 
al.'s 1980 and 1985 survey data, three principal modes of 
organization formation were observed. 1) Business groups, 2) 
Occupational groups like the American Medical Association 
and farmers and 3) groups spawned by social movements 
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(Walker et al. 1992). The Coalition came out of a social 
movement: the environmental movement. 
Truman's voluntary association and Olson's by-product theory 
do not account for the rise in non profit groups such as the 
Fund for Animals, the Women's League for Peace and Freedom 
and Common Cause or the "big ten" environmental groups 
(Berry, 1977, Mitchell, 1979, McFarland, 1984). Also scant 
attention has been paid by these scholars to state level 
interest organization development, although these groups 
have been suggested to have more power than national ones 
(Gray and Lowery, 1992). McFarland's case study of Common 
Cause was an interesting study not only in mass membership 
strategies, but the techniques and interpersonal 
entrepreneurship of the organizers (McFarland, 1983). Walker 
and Hula have suggested at least at the national level that 
a better understanding of collective goods and selective 
incentives could come from expanding the unit of analysis 
"individual decision to join (Walker et al. 1992, Hula, 
1994). 11 
Clues to public interest organizations development has been 
clarified by reliance on resource mobilization approaches 
described by (McCarthy and Zald, 1978, see also Walker et 
al. 1992 for a discussion). Resource mobilization theory is 
a broad category of moves by key actors in the social 
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movement process that are still ambiguous but provide a 
promising avenue for investigation. Resource mobilization 
tends to see social movement groups as the workings of 
coalition formation, entrepreneurship and a goal directed 
ordering of activities. There is according to this view a 
Social Movement Sector (SMS) of the economy and specific 
Social Movement Industries (SMI) (McCarthy and Zald, 1978) 
and importantly, Social Movement Organizations (SMO)'s. Even 
with the resource mobilization perspective, an explanation 
for the Coalition that would help show how the organization 
developed, perhaps even help the Coalition or an 
organization that wished to fight it, is not available. 
IV. THE COALITION AS AN AVENUE TO TEST EXPLANATIONS OF 
INTEREST GROUP FORMATION. 
Truman's theory that like minded people form associations 
because they have interests in common is an old theory in 
political science but one that could be compared with the 
experience of the Coalition. Olson's view that the group 
formed for another purpose can be compared as well. The 
ideas of complex resource mobilization might fit elements of 
both Truman and Olson if, as Moe 1980 asserts, the type of 
rational behavior or the incentive was better understood. A 
study of the Coalition provides the opportunity to test 
these theories. 
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The Coalition is an alliance of organizations. The study 
focuses on a coalition of organizations that formed a single 
new incorporated organization -- the Coalition and departs 
from the traditional focus of interest group research. 
Environmental law organizations, church groups, the academic 
community and people working for organizations around the 
state capital formed the Coalition for more complex reasons 
than the individual decision to join. 
The Coalition is local and national in scope. Reports of 
widespread conflict between the managers .of national 
environmental groups and local grassroots organizations have 
been noted by several observers (Ingram and Mann, 1987, 
Basso, 1989, Mitchell 1990). These scholars describe a 
professionalization of national interest group 
administrators and local persons who frequently believe that 
the cloistered national professionals are out of touch with 
the realities of everyday environmental advocacy. The study 
shows that the group formed at the local level with certain 
strategic national ties. 
Empirical case studies that followed the Olson by-product 
challenge concerning the public interest movement, show 
Olson's model falling short, yet these case studies use the 
Olson logic as the starting point to explain their group's 
development through overcoming the collective goods dilemma. 
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Three decades after Olson's collective goods challenge, 
resource mobilization theory which developed almost as a 
response to the inadequacies of by-product theory has become 
useful for understanding social movements and social 
movement organizations. Moreover, political scientists have 
begun to apply resource mobilization approaches to their 
studies of interest groups who contest by-product theory. 
Recent systematic survey research by Walker (1992) that 
relies on resource mobilization theory, better explains why 
and how interest groups develop. 
Yet that research is based on aggregate statistics and gives 
only a partial view of how resource mobilization accounts 
for group development. Put simply, few investigators have 
left theoretical models and survey research centers, 
ventured into the field and collected first hand assessments 
of not just what the organization says it does or why it 
formed, but how the organization's work and succeed. This 
chapter ends by showing that this study's hypotheses shed 
more light on the "how" of group formation for an emerging 
group in an ecosystem of national importance. 
The Coalition overcame the free rider problem that is 
especially troublesome to non profit public interest 
organizations that need resources to grow. Potential members 
are always tempted to free ride because public interest 
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organizations do not provide direct benefits to their 
melllbership that induces organizational joining. For 
instance, in seeking the environmental goal of sustaining 
coastal wetlands, the Coalition has sought a "collective 
good," that is a good that will be available to people 
whether they support the Coalition or not. Yet the Coalition 






The participant observation strategy of this study allowed 
the investigator to gain access to the workings of the 
Coalition and its associated setting (Whyte, 1955, Lofland, 
1984). The setting consisted of the social structure of an 
organization composed of people working in and around 
Coastal Louisiana and related parts of the Mississippi 
Alluvial Plain. The inquiry was initiated by driving to the 
research setting: the coastal parishes of Terrebonne, Bayou 
Lafrouche, Avoyelles, Cameron and others in southern 
Louisiana, as well as the cities of New Orleans and Baton 
Rouge. Continual contact was maintained with the Coalition 
staff office on Highland Road in Baton Rouge. 
The investigator approached the setting as a naive learner 
attempting to understand the wetland decline problem and the 
Coalition's role in improving Louisiana's coastal wetlands 
status. The investigator offered to do minor tasks for the 
organization such as driving staff to appointments or swamp 
tours or stapling literature like Whyte (1955). Because the 
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investigator portrayed himself as a non expert interested in 
the problem (which was true for most of the incentives for 
organization studied), he told everyone he needed their 
expertise to provide clues to the ecological problems of 
wetland decline and how the Coalition was trying to save 
them. The investigator then had the opportunity to observe 
the mechanics of" the organization, gather its documents and 
interview its people. 
Although almost everyone interviewed was enthusiastic and 
discussed their role in the organization and knew that the 
investigator was studying the Coalition and its efforts; it 
was unclear to many participants exactly what the 
investigator wanted from them. Although they were told that 
the investigator wanted to know how the Coalition 
organization occurred, mention specifically of things that 
were called incentives was not discussed. This stance 
allowed the investigator to be lead by Coalition 
participants into understanding the organization and lessen 
the introduction of bias from asking potentially leading 
questions about the Coalition organization. 
The investigator lived for several months at a time in 1992 
in Louisiana and conducted interviews with Coalition 
organizers in their homes and offices. When a personal 
interview could not be arranged as was the case with James 
38 
Tripp in New York City an extensive telephone contact was 
made. The investigator lived sometimes in his car, a low 
cost ($10 per night) research station Louisiana Universities 
Marine Consortium (LUMCON) in Cocodrie, Louisiana, and a low 
income apartment in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Cocodrie, 
Louisiana, is not on many maps but is on route 56 about five 
miles south of Chauvin, Louisiana in a brackish marsh area 
that abuts Terrebonne Bay). 
In Baton Rouge the investigator obtained a community library 
membership at Louisiana State University and was able to 
conduct interviews at the University with Paul Templet, 
Coalition headquarters in Baton Rouge as well as the state 
capital. The investigator befriended the Coalition staff 
gaining access to its records and then used the Coalition's 
social network to gain access to interviews. The 
investigator left Cocodrie, Louisiana approximately one 
month before Hurricane Andrew directly struck the coastal 
hamlet in August 1992. The area did not suffer damage that 
would prevent a re-evaluation of people and institutions. No 
one was killed and most people in the area still live and 
work there (1995). Although there was serious damage to 
shrimp and fish processing units in the area, the 
resumptions of normal economic activities has continued. 
II. OBJECTIVES AND THE METHOD USED 
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The logic and procedures presented here form a qualitative 
case study that is designed to cite existing interest group 
formation theories and match them against the experience of 
the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana. Data collection 
commenced from January 1992 to July 1992 in several 
locations in Louisiana in order to describe the 
organization, interview Coalition participants, acquire 
documents and subsequently identify incentives associated 
with organizational formation and maintenance. The 
incentives depict a picture of an organization and its 
supporters. 
The data are organized around the occupational categories of 
the participants: lawyers, academic ecologists, grassroots 
groups that networked with Michael Osborne in New Orleans 
and a general category of people in the capital who work 
with the Louisiana legislature called the state capital 
network. The state capital network is composed of a variety 
of professional categories who interact continually around 
the state legislature, natural resource agencies and 
Governors office in Baton Rouge. The interview data are 
presented as results in the next chapter. 
The rest of this chapter is broken into three remaining 
sections: 1) selecting the case, gaining entrance to the 
organization, a description of the research setting, how 
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members were discovered and how they were interviewed. 2) 
Deriving categories from the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) 
and explaining the procedure for testing a crucial case 
(Eckstein, 1975). 3) Finally the rationale and usefulness of 
the case study method and its applicability to the study of 
the coalition are briefly discussed (Eckstein, 1975, Yin, 
1983, Feagin et al, 1990). 
III. CHOOSING THE TOPIC: 
The topic was chosen because the biologically diverse 
bottomland hardwood forests of the Lower Mississippi 
Alluvial Plain continued to decline catastrophically with 
serious implications for biological diversity, federal 
wetland law, and the capacity of the political system to act 
in a mature and judicious fashion to sustain the wetland 
resource (Shaw, 1985 p. 236, U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 1988, 1994, EDF, 1992). Many different disciplines 
and groups have a stake in what happens to the wetlands, and 
the Coalition represents several of them: lawyers, academic 
ecologists, state and federal politicians, natural resource 
agencies and the people who live near and literally on the 
wetlands. 
Further, over 50 years of political science inquiry directed 
at Army Corps of Engineer water projects in the Lower 
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Mississippi has gleaned information describing important 
regulatory processes, and describing the character of "iron 
triangles" between the Corps of Engineers, local officials 
and congressional committees. (Maass, 1951, McCool, 1987, 
Ripley and Franklin, 1991). In addition, some political 
scientists have recently suggested that the nature of 
traditionally low conflict federal water policies is 
changing to a high conflict regulatory one without 
specifying instances of how this is occurring in the lower 
Mississippi (Ripley and Franklin, 1991). Ripley and Franklin 
(1991) allude to this change in the "Congress, the 
Bureaucracy and Public Policy" but do not specify examples 
of how the increase of political tension could be observed 
in one of the most important federal water systems in the 
country. The Coalition experience described later in the 
results sections provides a good example of this change. 
The study of the emergence of the Coalition then, 
contributes to a long line of research in the Lower 
Mississippi Alluvial Plain that seeks to understand policies 
surrounding the area's wetlands through federal water 
policy. Academics from a variety of disciplines have 
demonstrated interest in the lower Mississippi for a very 
long time. It is significant that EDF had litigated a major 
wetland case that impacted the implementation of the Clean 
Water Act (Avoyelles Sportsmans League v. Alexander 1979). 
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EDF saw, along with other members of the ''Big Ten," that 
Louisiana was as important an area as the Grand Canyon or 
Niagara Falls. This study argues that an incentive of James 
Tripp of EDF and others of the national legal group were in 
Louisiana for symbolic reasons as much as any other. 
A recent instance of political organization in this setting, 
that involved the national and state actors involved in 
policy change provides additional light on water policy 
change activities. Also the relationship of this 
organizational activity can be related to existing theory on 
the formation o.f groups. 
IV. GETTING IN AND ACQUIRING THE DATA 
Telephone contact was initiated in October 1991 with the 
general counsel of EDF in New York to determine if he was 
pursuing any political activity related to their wetland 
litigation demonstrated in Avoyelles Sportsmans League v. 
Alexander (1979), a case strategically brought by EDF to 
sustain the declining bottomland hardwood forest. Prior to 
Avoyelles, the Corps did not regulate the taking of 
bottomland hardwood forests which have been drastically 
reduced since the turn of the century because of water 
projects and agricultural policy (U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 1988). 
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The general counsel advised that EDF was still pursuing 
wetland preservation efforts in cooperation with the 
Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana; that since the 
bottomland hardwoods were nearly gone, attention had shifted 
to the declining Louisiana coastal wetlands also subject to 
section 404 under jurisdiction of the Corps. The general 
counsel pointed out that 40% of U.S. coastal wetlands are in 
Louisiana. The general counsel suggested that Dr. G. Paul 
Kemp, Coalition Director of Science and Technology, should 
be contacted for information about the Coalition's 
activities. After gaining telephone confidence with Dr. Kemp 
in Baton Rouge, he suggested that a dissertation be 
conducted concerning how the Coalition came about because 
few of the people involved really had a grasp as to how the 
whole effort evolved. He added that the investigator should 
come to Louisiana but did not know how to fund such a study. 
Data were obtained in person in Louisiana three times in 
1992. First, a one week exploratory visit to Baton Rouge, 
Houma in Terrebonne Parish and Constance Beach (south west 
Louisiana) was undertaken by automobile to establish contact 
with Coalition members. Second, in March and April 1992, 
lodging was secured at the Louisiana Universities Marine 
Consortium (LUMCON) in Cocodrie, Louisiana, twenty five 
miles south o.f Houma, Louisiana in a marsh near the Gulf o.f 
Mexico in Terrebonne Parish a few miles from Bayou 
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Lafrouche. From LUMCON interviews were conducted in New 
Orleans (one hour away from Cocodrie) and Baton Rouge (two 
hours away from Cocodrie). 
On April 9th an all day trip with the Army Corps of 
Engineers down the Mississippi between Old River and 
Donalsonville was conducted where the investigator 
interacted with Coalition supporters, concerned citizens and 
the Army. The investigator obtained an extensive interview 
at this time with Rob Gorman, a principal Coalition founder 
and organizer and Associate Director of Catholic Social 
Services in Houma, Louisiana. Gorman had been invited to an 
all day inspection of the lower Mississippi and to interact 
and have lunch with Corps officials. Also, the investigator 
met Moumus Clavrie an attorney and Debra Callahan of thew. 
Alton Jones Foundation. In addition, the investigator had 
several lengthy conversations with General Patrick Stevens, 
Commander of the Lower Mississippi Valley Division. General 
Stevens is the son-in-law of General Clark the former Chief 
of the Corps of Engineers nationwide and the architect of 
the Corps' community participation effort of the 1970's. The 
Army had asked Dr. Kemp to bring his associates along and he 
had invited the investigator. 
The LUMCON field work allowed interviewing marine scientists 
in the course of their investigations and visiting local 
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landowners who were losing their property because of coastal 
wetland decline. LUMCON through the assistance of Dr. Paul 
Samarco, provided a room where the investigator kept his PC 
and stored documents and other supplies. The third trip from 
May to July 1992 involved brief visits to LUMCON (one with 
faculty members from Oklahoma State University) and a 
prolonged stay in a low income apartment in Baton Rouge that 
had to be abandoned in July due to a flood. Because of 
Hurricane Andrew striking LUMCON in August 1992 plans were 
abandoned to revisit the site in the fall. Although a brief 
visit was made in late July as the investigator left 
Louisiana. 
Documents and interviews were gathered at Coalition 
headquarters in Baton Rouge, member offices and homes 
throughout Louisiana and via telephone. Participant 
observation techniques (Lofland and Lofland, 1984) were 
conducted to familiarize the researcher with the 
organization and its social and physical environment through 
living and working in Coastal Louisiana. During the field 
work time a catalogue of Coalition documents at organization 
headquarters on Highland Road in Baton Rouge and member 
offices was obtained and access for interviews to Coalition 
members was secured. 
The first exploratory two week visit to the Coalition in 
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Baton Rouge was conducted starting January 12, 1992. The 
Coalition's office was located in a small shopping center on 
High.land road in Baton Rouge about ten miles from the state 
capital complex and seven miles from Louisiana State 
University. The Coalition has a fax machine and the editor 
of the Coalition's publications was sending fax notices to 
members to alert them to impending legislative changes at 
the state capital. 
At first no one was available and the Coalition's 
publication editor did not know what to do to support the 
investigation, or house the investigator. After talking with 
the editor, she vo1unteered the entire collection of 
Coalition board minutes, including financial papers along 
with the Coalition's public documents. 
The initial collection of Coalition documents spanned 
December 1987 to October 1992 and included personnel matters 
and financial statements that indicated where some of the 
Coalitions funding came from. The Coalition booklet "Here 
Today, Gone Tomorrow?" was obtained and contained eighteen 
engineering/science and legislative goals. The editor 
indicated that Mr. James Tripp was instrumental in 
developing the booklet "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" and that 
he had persuaded the Coalition membership to create such a 
document. 
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From the board minutes and other records, names of the 
participants were gathered to interview at their businesses 
and homes throughout Coastal Louisiana. The investigator 
sought and obtained permission to interview the members by 
being introduced to them by the staff at headquarters. Two 
days later, Coalition Executive Director took the 
investigator to lunch and outlined the development of the 
Coalition and his need for grant funding. He volunteered his 
personal vitae as well as that of other Coalition members 
and indicated that the investigator could use the Coalition 
office to make telephone calls. 
As an example of Coalition activities, the Science and 
Technology Director drove the investigator to one of the 
Coalitions "Coastwatch" programs that is a public hearing 
conducted by Coalition members in a Catholic Church in 
LaRose, Louisiana, in Bayou Lafrouche Parish. The hearing 
was conducted by Robert Gorman, a social worker and 
Associate Director of Catholic Social Services for the Houma 
Thibodaux Diocese. Persons attending the hearing were angry 
about many wetland regulations and the difficulty in 
obtaining building permits. The session was taped on local 
TV and showed the identity of the investigator who was then 
known to many residents throughout the area because of the 
TV exposure. 
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V. ACQUISITION OF INTERVIEW DATA 
Each person selected for an interview was told that the 
interview would be taped and that the investigator wanted to 
know what happened as the Coalition developed. They were 
asked specifically before taping what their role in the 
Coalition had been and if they could recount how the 
organization came about. They were told that the purpose of 
the investigation was to understand the Coalition's role in 
wetland preservation and what everybody did to help the 
Coalition do this as the Coalition developed. 
Coalition members identified for interviews through board 
minutes and staff sug.gestions were: 
Mr. Rob Gorman, Associate Director of Catholic Social 
Services, Houma-Thibodaux, Catholic Diocese. Mr. Gorman, a 
social worker trained at UNC-Chapel Hill, helped local 
fisherman in Bayou Lafrouche Parish to organize themselves 
and eventually seek legal help from Michael Osborne to open 
up fishing areas that became sealed off because of wetland 
decline. The areas were closed off because large property 
owners subsequently asserted new land rights when a canal 
was dug. The status of coastal wetlands created a property 
change that hurt the fishermans' take from oyster beds, 
shrimp and other fish and sending them to Catholic Social 
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Services for food. 
Dr. John Day Jr., Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge 
and LUMCON. Dr. Day was approached in the gallery of LUMCON 
and interviewed. A later follow up interview was conducted 
in his room. Dr. Day provided a capsule review of the 
coastal declining wetlands of Louisiana and reasons for 
their decline emphasizing canals from oil and gas 
exploration. Dr. Day commented on his association with the 
environmental lawyers going back several years and his 
education in Marine Science at UNC-Chapel Hill where he 
graduated around the time of Earth Day 1970. 
Mr. Michael Osborne, Attorney in Baton Rouge and founding 
board member. Mr Osborne invited the investigator into his 
office in Prytania Street in New Orleans where he provided 
an extensive interview. He described meeting Professor Houck 
when he was commuting from Washington, D.C., Working with 
James Tripp and several cases that they had collaborated on 
since the early 1970's. 
Professor Oliver A. Houck, Tulane Law School, Editor of the 
Tulane Environmental Law Review and former co-founder of the 
legal arm of the National Wildlife Federation in Washington, 
D.C .. Professor Houck granted a lengthy interview and 
provided documentation about his efforts on the Atchafalaya 
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Swamp while at NWF. 
Dr. Paul Templet, Professor of Environmental Studies at 
Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, author of 
articles on Coastal Zone Management in the Journal of 
Coastal Resources, Coalition member and former Secretary of 
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality under 
Governor Buddy Roemer. Trained at Duke University and LSU in 
chemistry. Dr. Templet's office was very close to the 
investigators apartment in Baton Rouge and afforded numerous 
instances of interviews. Dr. Templet left office because 
Governor Buddy Roemer had been defeated for re-election by 
Governor Edwin Edwards in a three way election that featured 
David Duke. 
Mr. James Tripp, General Counsel of the Environmental 
Defense Fund in New York, Coalition member and frequent 
visitor to Coastal Louisiana. Mr. Tripp introduced the 
investigator to the Coalition. Obtained several telephone 
interviews with Mr. Tripp. 
The Reverend Kirby Veret of the Methodist Church in Dulac, 
Louisiana. Attended Easter services in 1992 in church that 
had been under water in Hurricane Juan. Reverend Veret was a 
board member of the Coalition. Reverend Veret conducted an 
Easter service that the investigator went to in Dulac, 
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Louisiana. 
Mr. Joel Laporouse, fisherman and retired Oil worker of 
C.ocodrie Louisiana. Attended the annual boat blessing in 
Chauvin, and spent the day on Lake Boudreau with the 
Laparouse family discussing the economic conditions of the 
area. Mr. Laporouse is a shrimper, trapper and oil field 
worker and had his daughter drive the investigator around 
the area. 
State Senator Ben Bagert, New Orleans trial attorney. 
Coalition member who ran for office talking about the 
decline of the wetlands. Bagert produced a letter from 
George Bush at the 1988 Republican National convention to 
him promising "No New Net Loss" of wetlands. He introduced 
the Coalition's adopted wetlands restoration bill in the 
state legislature. 
Dr. Paul Kemp, Coastal Geologist and Professor, Louisiana 
State University, Former Director of Science and Technology 
of the Coalition, Kemp advocated the ideas of restoring 
marsh by using oil field pipelines to spread dredged 
Mississippi sediment. Kemp's remarks were taped on numerous 
visits to wetland areas and Coalition functions, but are 
generally not used. Dr. Kemp acted as an ecological mentor 
and introduced the investigator to his wife mother and 
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sister. Dr. Kemp's ideas on oil pipelines as sediment 
diversion techniques are covered as are comments about Dr. 
Kemp from other Coalition members. 
Ms. Eloise Wall, Director of Citizens for a Clean 
Environment, in Baton Rouge. Ms. Wall was interviewed twice 
in her home in Baton Rouge. Ms. Wall, Coalition member, is a 
lobbyist at the state capital in Baton Rouge. 
V. DERIVING CATEGORIES AND ORGANIZING THE DATA 
The emergence of categories became apparent in the 
participant observation and interview stages of the work 
when each interviewee described how the organization 
happened and their role. This is the technique of building 
theory from the data that has been advocated by Glaser and 
Strauss (Glasser and Strauss, 1967). Most people interviewed 
and observed discussed their interest in the Coalition based 
on an occupational category. For example, both Houck and 
Tripp describe coming to Louisiana from the east coast for 
the purpose of litigation for their organizations. They are 
lawyers. Houck even mentioned the fact that he was always 
trying to put some coalition together throughout the 
seventies concerning the Army's plans to divert water in the 
Atchafalaya. 
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Both Gagilano, and Templet described getting the legislature 
to fund scientific research. Gorman was Associate Director 
of Catholic Social Services that was being hard pressed for 
resources in their food bank because shrimper parishioners 
could not get access to their fishing areas. 
The Coalition's booklet "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" lists 
eighteen objectives for the Coalition ranging for calls for 
an end to canal building to modifications in marsh 
management plans. Some specify engineering activities. 
Together they espouse the purposive or expressive benefits 
of the organization. By joining the organization a person or 
an organization is linked to regulatory, administrative and 
public engineering goals. 
VI. RATIONALE FOR HOW THE DATA ARE USED 
Four sets of data categories can be recognized from the 
people contacted, literature obtained, and that which 
emanate from the interviews. They are activities and 
incentives associated with occupational categories. First, 
the legal domain of the case that involves the three 
attorneys and their incentives, second, the ecology faculty 
of Louisiana State University and their incentives, third, 
the grassroots groups of who represented Osborne clients or 
his environmental friends are also an important catagory. 
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Finally, a diverse group of people herein called "the State 
Capital network,. " The State Capital Network is a group of 
lobbyists, and legislators allied with the current Governor 
that work in various state agencie.s and Baton Rouge 
Organizations. 
RATIONALE FOR THE CASE STUDY METHOD 
VII .. Case studies for political inquiries are a serious mode 
of acquiring new knowledge about social phenomenon such as 
interest group behavior, yet are often depicted as the weak 
cousins of "better" quantitative studies. Even though there 
are serious threats to the validity of quantitative studies, 
particularly the inductive fallacy, a trend toward 
quantification exists in social science research. The 
frequent criticism is that it is wrong to make 
generalizations from a particular case when discus.sing a 
11one shot case study" (Campbel and Stanley, 1966, Nachmias 
and Nachmias, 1988). Also, case studi.es are frequently seen 
as mere adjuncts to quantitative work and not seen as 
essential avenues to new knowledge in their own right. This 
is unfortunate because the role of theory in political 
science is the development or building of what Merton (1968) 
calls middle level theory, a theory that is more powerful 
than an ad hoc proposition but not as strong as perhaps 
natural selection or quantum theory. Theories of .deviance, 
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role sets, bureaucratic behavior, legislative behavior and 
the subject of this investigation interest group theory must 
develop into usable middle level theories. 
Eckstein (1975) takes exception to this trend and provides 
an exhaustive defense of the varieties of qualitative case 
study method in political science and the weaknesses of a 
reliance on quantification. Eckstein cites Flatt's (1964) 
use of the method of "strong inference" for political 
inquiries using a case. Eckstein argues that using a crucial 
case that makes possible the exclusion of several rival 
hypothesis has the property of increasing the speed at which 
new knowledge is obtained. Although Platt advocates the case 
study for advances in high energy physics and molecular 
biology, Eck,stien and others have pointed out that much of 
the improvement of middle level theory has been obtained 
through the case study method (Platt, 1964, Eckstein, 1975, 
Baily, 1992). 
The examples of case study that are important to political 
science are extensive. Selznick's ( 1949) ''TVA and the 
Grassroots: A Study of Politics and organization," Hunter's 
(1953) "Power in the City" and Dahl's (1962) "Who Governs" 
usually come to mind immediately as examples that continue 
to beckon for renewed investigations and have withstood the 
test of time (Selznick, 1949, Hunter, 1953, Dahl, 1962). 
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More recent case study research on interest groups such as 
McFarland's "Common Cause: Lobbying in the Public Interest" 
or the two interest groups Berry studied using participant 
observation highlight the importance of direct empirical 
case study investigation known also as qualitative methods 
(Berry, 1977, McFarland, 1984). Frequently several case 
studies are employed such as Mitchell's powerful critique of 
Mancur Olson's by-product theory using the "big ten" 
environmental interest groups. 
Criticisms of qualitative case studies such as: they can 
only account for "one point" or observation on an x,y axis 
in a quasi-experimental research design and therefore may 
not be a close or even relevant observation concerning a 
theory under study, ignores the strengths of case studies 
and the weaknesses of quantitative ones. Glaser (1978) has 
summarized the reasons why case studies are important and 
not weaker cousins of quantitative ones. The ways to new 
knowledge are more than the theory verification used in 
quantitative studies and involve obtaining more accurate 
evidence, refining existing concepts, and making empirical 
generalizations (Glaser, 1978). 
Merton (1968) argued that the role of the social sciences is 
to build theory because social science has not yet achieved 
the power of theories in the hard sciences. Social 
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scientists should be like Darwin, going out into the field 
to gather evidence and build theory from that evidence. The 
Coalition provides an avenue to obtain more evidence about 
an interest group's formation and maintenance in a social 
movement and an ecosystem of national importance. 
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CHAPTER IV RESULTS 
LEGAL FOUNDERS INCENTIVES 
I. WETLAND LAW CHANGES AND GROUP FORMATION INCENTIVES 
A change in federal water policy gave environmental law 
organizations the opportunity to induce more rigorous 
administration of the Army Corps of Engineers policy toward 
wetlands. The Clean Water Act of 1977 changed the mix of 
responsibilities of the Corps of Engineers that had built 
water projects under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and 
destroyed wetlands in the name of navigation and flood 
control. The traditional relationships of the Corps, members 
of congress from the lower Mississippi and navigation and 
flood control interests faced a new set of environmentally 
concerned actors from the environmental groups that Houck 
(National Wildlife Federation NWF), Osborne (Sierra Club 
Local Chapter) and Tripp (Environmental Defense Fund EDF) 
worked for. 
Traditionally the Corps had authority over all the "waters 
of the United States" to serve the commercial navigation 
interests on the Mississippi. Lawsuits and congressional 
testimony from environmental groups such as EDF, NWF, and 
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National Resources Defense Counsel (NRDC), brought the Corps 
into federal court in a way that changed its wetland taking 
rules (Holland V. us 1974, NRDC V. Callaway, 1975, Avoyelles 
V. Alexander, 1979). Since 1970, Houck, Tripp and Osborne 
spent significant portions of their careers working for or 
in association with organizations that tried to shape the 
Clean Water Act's wetland application. The reasons for a new 
local organization for Houck, Tripp and Osborne are grounded 
in this policy change. 
Since the turn of the century the pork barrel projects of 
navigation and flood control and bottomland hardwood forest 
wetland conversion to soybean, corn and cotton fields, 
aroused little public attention or indignation. Political 
scientists call this arrangement an iron triangle because 
the three policy components -- a congressional committee, 
the Corps of Engineers, and local officals -- worked 
together to allocate large sums of money to reclaim wetlands 
and build water projects that helped all three parties in a 
quid pro quo (Maass, 1951, U.S. Department of the Interior, 
1988, See Shaffer et al. Figure 1). Lowi (1972) referred to 
this type of arrangement as a low conflict "distributive 
policy" where an iron triangle allocates project money to an 
area like the lower Mississippi and all three parts of the 
iron triangle benefit. For over one hundred years the Rivers 
and Harbors Act iron triangle (and other policies like 
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1991 
Figure 1. Estimate of Reduction in Bottomland Hardwood 
Forest Wetlands in the Lower Mississippi, 
1883-1991, by Craig et al. (1992) 
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agriculture subsidies), provided congressmen reelection 
benefits, the Corps and the Agriculture Department 
appropriation benefits and local officials and businesses 
benefited through Mississippi navigation and other economic 
growth (See Maass, 1951, McCool, 1987, Ripley and Franklin, 
1991). 
Yet during this time much of the bottomland hardwood forest 
wetland area and the coastal wetlands of Louisiana was being 
drastically reduced at least in part because of the projects 
(U.S. Department of the Interior, 1988). Now that the rich 
bottomlands are largely reduced, the coastal wetlands are 
going too and groups like EDF and NWF see the area as a 
symbolic place to litigate nationally significant cases. 
EDF, NRDC, Sierra and NWF knew it was crucial to organize in 
order to put pressure on the Corps and state and local 
governments. The Corps did not embrace the spirit of wetland 
preservation in the 1972 and 1977 acts until it was forced 
to do so in court cases, one of which was: Natural Resources 
Defense Council NRDC v. Callaway (1975). In Callaway the 
Corps and the EPA contended that the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act pertained to ''navigable waters" as the agencies 
had narrowly defined them and therefore wetlands would be 
excluded from their jurisdiction. But in deciding against 
the government, the Callaway court found that Congress: 
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" ••• asserted federal jurisdiction over the 
nation's waters to the extent permissible under 
the commerce clause for purposes of the water Act; 
and the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of the 
Army Corps of Engineers acted unlawfully and in 
derogation of their responsibilities under the 
water Act by adopting a different definition [of 
waters of the United States]. (NRDC v. Callaway, 
D.O.C. 1975), Bean 1983, p. 212, EDF 1992). 
James Tripp'S EDF co.lleague Michael Bean ( 1983) has noted, 
the Corps' response to Callaway was to move very slowly to 
carry out the section 404 process and issue a new class of 
permit called a general or nationwide permit. Because of 
this alternative to the normal section 404 process, parcels 
of wetlands under ten acres or of "minor environmental 
sig.nificance" began to be routinely allowed by the Corps 
(Bean, 1983}. This selective application of the law has 
allowed the Corps a way around strict permitting 
administration thus allowing vast wetland areas to not be 
protected. Because of its public interest review process, 
the Corps has several ways it can administer the law marking 
part of a great policy divide in which the Corps decides 
what counts as a po.ssible wetland regulatory area ( See 
Ablard and O'Neil p. 57, 1976). The Corps engages in a 
balancing act between pro business wetland decisions and 
environmental organization ones depending on a particular 
situation. The Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana became 
an organization in part designed to encourage the Lower 
Mississippi Valley Division of the Corps, with its extensive 
permitting activities, to administer the act in a pro 
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wetland fashion and set an example for other Corps offices. 
In contrast to the cozy low conflict wetland conversions to 
agricultural and improved navigation, the wetland 
implications of the Clean Water Act are highly controversial 
and are what Lowi (1972) called a high conflict "regulatory 
policy" (Lowi, 1972). Moreover, the Clean Water Act has 
extensive legal ramifications because of the untested 
latitude of the agencies powers and the continuing advances 
in the ecological understanding of wetland science (Houck, 
1988). The statute has the potential of a major impact on 
private property interests depending on how agencies and 
courts define its scope and limit its use. As Oliver Houck 
noted in a 1988 Colorado Law Review Article, section 404: "· 
.• lies like an open wound across the body of environmental 
law, one of the simplest statutes to describe and one of the 
most painful to apply. H (Houck, 1989, p.773). The lower 
Mississippi has a vast wetland area that has been reduced by 
both government and private actions over the last century 
and the administrative delineation of what "taking" means in 
these circumstances begs for definition. Houck has noted 
elsewhere that most of the wet1.and permits· issued by the 
Corps of Engineers are issued from the Lower Mississippi 
Valley Division of the Corps in Vicksburg, Mississippi whose 
jurisdiction includes the state of Louisiana (Houck, 1983). 
Louisiana is not only wetland rich, it is also legally ripe 
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for action. 
II. HOUCK, OSBORNE, TRIPP AND THE NEED FOR AN 
ORGANIZATION 
There were other members of the big ten interested in 
the new water policies nationwide, but both Tripp and Houck 
targeted Louisiana and had been commuting there regularly 
since 1970. Since Louisiana has the second largest wetlands 
surface area in the lower forty-eight states and because 
there was a legal history of significance to wetlands 
destruction by government policy there, Louisiana like 
Florida has been crucial legal ground for wetlands policy 
development throughout the nation. Tripp and Houck commuted 
to Louisiana separately f.or their national environmental law 
organizations and were impressed by the magnitude of 
Louisiana's national importance and are recorded in 
congressional testimony in 1978 referring to the need for 
preservatio.n of the bottomland hardwoods and the coastal 
mars.hes of Louisiana, (Congressional Record, 1978). 
Houck initially came to Louisiana because of the destruction 
of the Atchafalaya that was being exacerbated by the Corps 
of Engineer's intent to put a new flood control structure 
through the area. He related in an interview for this study 
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in April 1992 how he became interested in Louisiana and the 
Coalition organization: 
HOUCK: "· .. [I was] a federal prosecutor for four 
years, at the end of which I was really burning out on 
criminal prosecution and Earth Day was hitting 1970-71 
and it started kindling old flames in me for the 
environment. I've always been attracted by the 
out-of-doors and spent a lot time in the out-of-doors. 
So, it was a natural for me to shift from criminal 
prosecution to what I considered to be environmental 
prosecution, seemed to be the imbalance that we were 
spending so much time in trying to keep the junkies 
from taking T.V. sets and Exxon was walking away with 
the Rocky Mountains." 
"It seemed the big criminals were unattended to, so I 
went over and with another fellow, we started a legal 
arm of a large environmental organization, The National 
Wildlife Federation. I became their General Counsel 
and I directed their legal programs for ten years. By 
1981 it was a very strong outfit. Located in lots of 
states. All of the environmental litigating and action 
organizations grew in the 1970's and in '81 I came down 
to Tulane. The reason I came down was that the very 
first case I picked up in 1971 was a Louisiana case, 
saving a big swamp west of here [Interview in New 
Orleans at Tulane University Law School], which was a 
part of the coastal zone of the Atchafalaya swamp. It 
was the conservation issue of Louisiana for the 1960's 
and 1970's and I had been commuting down here on that 
issue once a· month for ten years and it went through 
all phases. I mean we made a movie, we litigated, we 
went to countless public hearings, we created 
teach-ins, love-ins, canoe-ins, speak-ins, media 
coverage of all types, we just fought the war. We 
emerged with a victory in 1981, a plan that would save 
the basin that the f-ederal government adopted, and 
abandoning a very old bad plan. At that time the 
Louisiana coast wasn't a gleam in anybody's 
eyes, nor was Louisiana's pollution a gleam in 
anybody's eye. I came down, took a leave in 1981 to 
come down to solve [the Atchafalaya], to cut a deal 
with the Governor [David Treen], the land owners, the 
gas companies, the timber companies •.. " 
That deal involved a skirmish with Interior Secretary James 
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Watt who apparently thought the old bad plan was a good one 
even though Watt did not prevail (Boulard et al. 1981). 
Houck became a Law Professor at Tulane and has contributed 
extensively on the subject of wetlands in legal journals. 
Professor Houck expanded on reasons for coming to Louisiana 
and discussed EDF and its counsel James T.B. Tripp. 
HOUCK: "There was no national attention to Louisiana. 
We [NWF, EDF] had been busy as national environmental 
organizations, putting ourselves in Denver, Colorado, 
Boulder and San: Francisco, and in New York, Washington, 
but we had no southern presence, no knowledge, no 
awareness of Louisiana, and here was this incredible 
treasure [the Louisiana Environment], going down the 
tube." 
"The first reports started coming in the late '70's 
about land loss [coastal wetlands] in the range of 
about 7-8 square miles a year. By the early 'SO's they 
were coming in the 20-20 square miles a year, by the 
mid eighties they were coming in the 50-60 square miles 
a year ••• " 
"Everything I thought Exxon was doing to the Rocky 
Mountains they were doing to the coast of Louisiana. 
The bewildering part of it, and the difficult part of 
it was that nobody knew anything. Louisiana was going 
down like some great natural resource such as the 
Titanic, and nobody was even sending out the radio 
s.ignals, it was just going to go. And we' re talking 
about wintering habitats for the Mississippi flyway 
which is half the nation's ducks. We're talking about a 
quarter of the nation's fisheries, we're talking about 
enormous resource systems collapsing and nobody paying 
any attention to it." 
"There were two national groups paying attention to it; 
me, the National Wildlife Federation, and Jim Tripp for 
EDF [Environmental Defense Fund]. Jim, and I 
throughout the seventies and continuing into the 
eighties were kind of a collaborative long range team 
and sort of a "Operation Louisiana" and we came down 
like some kind of medical emergency unit and pump a 
little oxygen in to this place every once in a while, 
but there wasn't any constituency to work with and 
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nothing would be left in place when you left. I must 
have spent half my time on the Atchafalaya just trying 
to build a coalition to stay in place .•. " 
As Houck fought the "war," which included the bottomland 
hardwoods area in the Atchafalaya and coastal wetlands, he 
got technical advice from Sherwood Gagliano, a 
geomorphologist from Louisiana state in Baton Rouge that 
worked with an LSU Ecologist Paul Templet, who has published 
articles on wetland decline. Gagliano was one of the early 
principal investigators of massive land loss in the 
Mississippi delta in 1964 (Coleman and Gagliano, 1964). 
Gagliano's work is still cited by people studying coastal 
land loss whether they agree with the claims of continued 
mas.sive loss or not (Ramsey and Penland 1990, Penland et al. 
1992). Gagliano's pioneering studies as well as others 
helped frame much of the initial goals of the Coalition and 
contributed to the ecological debate about wetland decline. 
Houck also befriended and collaborated with Michael Osborne. 
According to Osborne, as Houck was trying to get things 
organized in Louisiana for NWF he called his house one night 
and said words to the effect"· •. you don't know me but I 
need to come over and sleep on your couch tonight (Osborne 
1992)." From that time on they collaborated on cases and 
they all shared a growing relationship between professors at 
Louisiana State who provided technical expertise for their 
legal work that concerned the ecology of the lower 
68 
Mississippi. 
THE AVOYELLES CASE: AN EXAMPLE OF THE GROWING RELATIONSHIP 
One of the legal contributions that stemmed from this 
coterie was the Avoyelles Sportsman's League v. Alexander 
case, which James T.B. Tripp and Michael Osborne saw in 1979 
as a way to expand section 404 to Bottomland Hardwood 
forests {Avoyelles Sportsmans League v. Alexander, 1979). 
This case masked a change in public policy and signaled the 
importance of the relationship between the law and science 
within what would become the Coalition. Tripp for EDF and 
Osborne got a federal court to expand section 404 by relying 
on the ecological expertise of another Louisiana State 
University professor John w. Day Jr. 
Prior to Avoyelles, much agricultural activity which 
converted bottomland hardwood forests was ignored by the 
Corps. This seemed easy to do because subsection (f) of 
section 404 exempts "normal farming and silvicultural 
activity" from the 404 program. But Tripp and Houck 
recognized that the Corps of Engineers was being too 
selective in their interpretation of the statute. With Day's 
expertise they induced the court to find that the conversion 
of bottomland hardwood forests was destroying a wetland and 
required a permit from the Corps like any other wetland. The 
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Corps, following its historical destruction of bottomland 
hardwood forests, simply did not interfere with the 
landowners. 
In Avoyelles the Corps was named as a public defendant and 
the Elder Realty Co. and Bayou Lafrouche Inc. were named as 
private defendants. From the case record, the land subject 
to the case was a 200,000 acre tract in Avoyelles Parish, 
Louisiana, owned by Elder Realty company and Bayou Lafourche 
Inc. A bottomland hardwood forest, the land was biannually 
flooded by water from the Red River. Much of the vegetation 
in the area had already been cleared by logging and the 
tract in question represented twenty five percent of the 
remaining forested area in the Bayou Natchitoches Basin 
(Avoyelles Sportsmans League V. Alexander, 1979). 
In 1978 the private defendants began to clear the tract 
to convert it to a soybean field. It was then that the 
federal district court for the Western District of Louisiana 
issued an injunction that stopped the activity at the behest 
of Tripp, Osborne and their clients. The judge bifurcated 
the issues and then ordered two separate trials, one with 
respect to the activities of the defendants and a second 
trial that would decide if the tract in question was 
wetlands. Although the trial court was reversed in part and 
affirmed in part, after the defendants appealed to the 5th 
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circuit as Avoyelles Sportsmans League V. Marsh 1983, new 
wetland policy ground had been broken. 
Using John Day's scientific expertise the court got 
into the wetland definition and regulation business. 
Summarized here the trial court made policy by s.everal of 
its holdings: 1) the defendants use of bulldozers, dicing 
equipment, and ditch excavation equipment to cle-ar the land 
were held to be point sources of pollution under section 402 
of the Clean Water Act, 2) sheared trees, vegetation, 
scraped soil and leaf litter were held to be dredged and 
fill material under section 404 and required a pe,rmit from 
the Corps, 3) wetlands included the vegetation that "grows 
thereon," not just the whole swamp and requires a section 
404 permit, hence cutting trees is not to be ignored as a 
wetland altering function, 4) the defendants effected the 
navigable waters surrounding the area, because disturbing 
the wetlands altered the water that flows between the 
wetland and adjacent streams, thus violating section 10 of 
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, and finally 5) the 
defendants could farm on land already cleared. 
The first trial's holdings dealt with the activities that 
the owners were engaged in and thus the Corps should be 
regulating. The second trial was to decide whether the 
area was a wetland area and if it amounted to a taking. The 
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Avoyelles Sportsmans League group lead by Tripp and Osborne 
prevailed at booth trials and expanded the Corps policy 
whether the Army liked it or not. In a partial reversal, the 
appeals court chided the lower court for ruling that the 
area was a wetland and not letting the EPA make that 
determinati·on. The appeals court had ordered the lower court 
to accept the agency's expertise and jugment on wetland 
status. In the meantime however, the EPA had found what the 
lower court had found and included bottomland hardwood 
forests as wetlands and clearing activities as taking 
wetlands for purposes of section 404. 
What is not clearly understood without carefully 
examining the case record and interviewing the participants 
is this: much of the court's ruling is the scientific work 
of John Day. Day's ecological analysis was used by the court 
to write the opinion and describe ecological processes. The 
text of the decision goes on at length with scientific data 
explained as a legal act of environmental education. The 
case defines detritus, speaks of broadcast spawners in 
backwater areas being harmed by silt, discusses rates of 
erosion, the importance of the presence of certain types of 
vegetation and how these factors relate to each other. That 
was from the first trial where regulated acti vi tie.s were the 
issue, the second trial to decide wetlands status continues 
the trend. 
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While the appellate court revolted at the lower federal 
court doing the job of EPA and discussing the situation in 
ecological terms, by the time it reversed the lower court on 
some points, the EPA had assumed the same regulatory 
position as the plaintiffs (Tripp and Osborne) and the Corps 
changed its stance toward bottomland hardwoods as a wetland 
that they would regulate under section 404. Thus the use of 
ecological information to get the Corps to change nationwide 
wetlands policy was made. 
In an interview for this work, Michael Osborne pointed 
out that they relied heavily on their LSU Ecology 
colleagues. 
OSBORNE: "Well, Day had been a witness of ours • 
. • . and Dr. Templet I don't think we ever used him as 
a witness •.. but he had been a good, ..• he was a 
s,ource of information • • • " 
"· •. well you got to know him on a first name basis 
and you felt free to call him, and he would call us on 
occasion. Day of course being a witness, and of 
course, we got familiar with everybody out at LSU 
because, you know if you'd go see Dr. Day you'd stop in 
and see Dr. Gosslink ••• " 
HANNY: "The Wetland Res,ource Center up there [LSU]?'' 
OSBORNE: "Yes. And you know how its set up, there's one 
big long hall, and everybody's office is on the other 
side. You can't hardly •.• you know, they'd think 
you were discourteous if you walk by and the doors open 
and you didn't say hello. Then of course when the 
Avoyelles Sportsman's League came along, we had any 
number of witnesses from LSU." 
While the Avoyelles Sportsman's League case was unfolding 
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the years that Houck had spent on the Atchafalaya were 
coming to a close, and Houck began to summarize the emerging 
data on land loss being reported on coastal land loss in a 
legal policy treatise (Houck, 1983). The area is dominated 
by marshes and swamps that are indisputably wetlands but 
still nothing was being done. 
Tripp played a lead role in writing "Here Today, Gone 
Tomorrow?" and likened the wetlands of the Lower Mississippi 
Alluvial Plain to one of Americas great national "treasures" 
such as the Grand Canyon or Niagara Falls. Houck was so 
interested in Louisiana that he actually moved there after 
working on preserving the wetlands from his National 
Wildlife Federation Washington office. Osborne a Sierra Club 
member, was a graduate of Tulane and a member of the local 
bar with an office on Prytania Street in New Orleans. 
III. SUMMARY OF INCENTIVES FOR ORGANIZATION 
The symbolic goals of wetland preservation change at the 
federal level pointed Tripp and Houck in the direction of 
Louisiana for cases for their organizations. There is 
material benefit to the national organizations -- EDF, NWF 
and Sierra to be affiliated with an active group in 
Louisiana. As Tripp notes in 11Here Today Gone Tomorrow?" 
Louisiana is a "National Treasure" like the Grand Canyon or 
Niagara falls (Coalition to restore Coastal Louisiana, 
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1989). This was a symbolic or purposive goal highlighted by 
a permanent organization that enhanced the prestige of the 
national organizations and results in strategic material 
benefits. The benefits were great cases and affiliation with 
an active group in an ecosystem of national importance. The 
Coalition organization is a cooperative extension of the 
national organizations that can claim on Capital Hill and at 
the Pentagon that they are "in" Louisiana. Also the 
Coalition organization can claim to local Corps officials in 
Vicksburg and New Orleans that they have connections in 
Washington -- which they do. 
The solidary benefits are also apparent. Coalition people 
speak highly of each other. Lawyers are associated with 
ecologists that are being published in a cutting edge 
science. The scientists are not just publishing in journals 
for other academics to pass on their tenure. Their science 
is being used. When Governor Edwards visited LUMCON in May 
1992 the author taped his remarks about the future of the 
organization. LUMCON is mostly under the budgetary auspices 
of Louisiana State University. Edwards was very candid about 
the great work the LSU scientists were engaged in but said 
that it must be related to the state's economic goals 
(Edwards, 1992). He described the freshwater diversion being 
conducted at Bonnet Carrie Spillway that enhances oyster 
production in very positive terms. His message was that LSU 
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scientists had to do research that benefited the state. It 
remains for the lawyers and other Coalition partners to find 
ways of translating the merit of preserving wetlands into 
recognizable material benefits to Louisiana residents and 
Coalition supporters. 
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LSU ECOLOGIST INCENTIVES 
I. ACADEMIC COMMUNITY 
Academic members of the Coalition, largely ecology 
professors at Louisiana State University 1 played a role in 
the formation of the organization by providing technical 
guidance concerning the Coalition's goals of diverting 
sediment to build marsh. An appreciation of the public 
problem of wetland loss when litigating or engaging in 
policy advocacy, required assistance from experts who were 
studying the wetland ecology of the area. Because they were 
a part -of the development of the Coalition organization, it 
is essential to try to understand why the ecologists 
supported the organization and what they gave it. Ecologists 
are concerned about publishing new knowledge about the 
natural world in refereed scientific journals and have 
incentives for their actions too. 
Conducting their research careers as one might expect 
independently of one another, these members of the coalition 
collectively helped to build a body of knowledge about the 
Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plain and its wetlands. They 
identified evidence of massive coastal wetland loss and its 
repercussions and wanted these findings to be more widely 
known though their findings were published within the 
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scientific community .. After Sherwood Gagliano and his 
collaborators identified massive loss in a geology j.ournal 
in the 1960's, whole careers at LSU and elsewhere were 
devoted to the geology, biology, and wildlife ecology of the 
changing Louisiana wetlands much more so than had previously 
been the case (Coleman and Gagliano, 1964). 
What they found through the seventies looked very bad for 
the state of Louisiana. Land loss rates vary in terms of 
rate and extent, but one estimate shows the City of Houma, 
thirty miles' inland, becoming a coastal town by 2040 (See 
Figure 3, 4, 1990, Louisiana Geologic Survey). The same map 
shows a large area of Louisiana to be in danger of going 
under water with New Orleans much closer to open sea water 
than now. Within the last one hundred years land loss has 
been in the words of one conservative scientist 
"catastrophic" (Penland et al., 1992). Within the next 
century at least four coastal parishes (counties) will be 
largely lost according to some reports (Gagliano, 1981). 
Research that validated those observations -- and challenged 
some of those assumptions -- continues today (See for 
instance Penland et al., 1992). The facts surrounding 
wetland loss held by the Coalition represented an approach 
to public policy because the studies in "Here Today, Gone 
Tomorrow?" were used to suggest government policy changes .. 
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Figure 3. Newspaper Account (The Bayou Catholic) of 
Louisiana Geologic Survey's Estimate of 
Louisiana Coastal Wetland Loss by 2133 
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Some of the Coalition's actions have been adopted such as a 
mineral tax to provide marsh restoration and an office 
within the office of the Governor to fast track coastal 
restoration efforts. Some of the Coalition's goals such as a 
review of the value of marsh management activities and an 
emphasis on broader sediment deposition activities have not 
been adopted. Day contributed to the writing the scientific 
aspects of "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" with Tripp and 
others. In an interview for this work in 1992 at LUMCON he 
commented on working on the document and said: 
DAY:" ..• I do remember working on draft after draft 
of that thing and, you know, getting it going and was 
very active in the Coastal Coalition up until two years 
ago [interview April 1992] when I have been less active 
and more active in my research, but the research is 
producing information that is directly relevant to how 
we solve some of the problems of the coast." 
since "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" was written new 
information has been generated in the scientific dialogue. 
For instance, some investigators question the rate at which 
coastal land loss is now occurring and the relative 
importance to causes of loss (Penland et al. 1990). Greater 
attention is being placed on the importance of barrier 
island loss and the relative importance of different kinds 
of loss producing factors (Penland et al. 1992). Yet the 
issue is far from solved and during a visit to Chauvin, 
Louisiana, in the spring of 1992 the investigator witnessed 
81 
local businesses several inches under water when there is a 
light south wind. Local residents such as Joel Laparous 
complained that his front yard is inundated too and that 
this never happened before. 
The incentives of the ecologists of the Coalition are 
visible in the debate with state agency officials over how 
best to remedy the wetland loss. After a brief review of the 
general principles of delta land building ecology the 
participants state their views and the incentives are 
identified. 
II. THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM AND THE NEED FOR MORE INFORMATION 
There are aspects of the physical problem that most of the 
investigators agree on. What is coastal Louisiana today is 
the result of thousands of years of sediment deposition by 
the Mississippi River that supports a complex arrangement of 
landforms and associated vegetation (Chabreck, 1988). 
Vegetation such as marsh grasses frequently support the land 
forms from the erosive powers of the Gulf of Mexico. When 
marsh deteriorates, what is nearby ground is also in danger 
and everything south of an east west line going through 
Baton Rouge Louisiana, is subsiding at different rates. 
According to environmental writer Marc Riesner: " •.. much 
of southern Louisiana barely qualifies as land (Riesner, 
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1991). 11 
In an elaborate mosaic, Louisiana's salt, brackish, 
intermediate and fresh water marshes buttress swamps and are 
near the once vast bottomland hardwood wetland forests to 
the north (Chabreck 1988, Templet 1990, Craig et al., 1979). 
This biologically diverse area contains transition zones 
that require vegetation adapted to different conditions and 
the biological diversity is extraordinary (Chabreck, 1988). 
The vastness of the coastal wetlands is also extraordinary. 
Alexander et al. (1986) calculated that 3800 square miles of 
coastal marsh existed in Louisiana as of 1986, which is 40 
percent Of all US coastal marshes. The Mississippi ejects 
into the Gulf of Mexico the third largest volume of water on 
earth behind only the Amazon and the Congo (Coalition to 
Restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). The total sediment load is 
huge and is derived from the drainage of 41 percent of the 
adjoining states in the Mississippi watershed. 
The loss of coastal Louisiana threatens 40 percent of 
America's shell fishery and fin fishery, and the lives and 
livelihoods of thousands of people whose homes will go 
underwater in the next fifty years if present trends 
continue (Coalition to restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). 
Almost 25% of the state's area is adjoining to or is a 
wetland and 60% to 75% of its population lives within 50 
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miles of the coast, most very close to protective coastal 
wetlands (Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). 
Many low income people and native Americans practically live 
in marsh areas that are frequently inundated such as the 
Houma Indians in Dulac, Louisiana five miles from Cocodrie. 
At a 1992 Easter service, Reverend Kirby Veret, pastor of 
the United Methodist Church in Dulac said his church was 
under water eight feet when Hurricane Juan came through a 
few years back (Veret, 1992). 
In the past few thousand years the delta building process 
resulted in a series of lobes making up the alluvial fan of 
Louisiana. During intervals of about a thousand years, 
successive delta lobes formed at the shallow mouth of the 
river as it moved in a whip saw motion. While the sediment 
creates a new delta the remnants of the old delta lobes 
deteriorate but can still be discerned as major parts of the 
landscape thousands of years old (Coalition to Restore 
Coastal Louisiana, 1989). While this process occurs forming 
the deltaic plain, the inshore currents of the Gulf of 
Mexico wash escaping sediment to the west. The inshore 
westward movement of Mississippi sediment has created the 
chenier plain of southwestern Louisiana that is a series of 
ancient beaches. At Constance Beach in Cameron Parish, 
erosion has left only one remaining chenier that protects 
the Sabine Wildlife Refuge and Coalition member Rod 
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Gilbeaux's house. Both human and natural causes of land loss 
in Louisiana are recognized but little effort has been made 
to address the relative importance of each cause (Penland et 
al. I 1990) • 
In only three locations are Mississippi River sediment loads 
available to replenish the marsh areas: The Atchafalaya 
River mouth at Morgan city, Louisiana, South Pass at the 
distal end of the Mississippi, and the north eastern section 
of Lake Ponchatrain (Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, 
1989, Templet and Meyer-Arendt, 1988). Consequently, these 
are the only areas in the Mississippi delta where any land 
building is occurring. Because the Mississippi sediment 
moves into areas of depth and currents not directed at the 
deltaic and chiener plains of the coast and because the 
sediment from spring flooding that would replace lost 
material inland moves into the Gulf is lost delta building 
declines (Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). 
Over the last several millennia delta building has resulted 
in a 1 to 3 square mile increases in overall delta land area 
(Coalition to Restore coastal Louisiana, 1989). Even as the 
lobes of the Mississippi deteriorated over the last seven 
thousand years, new land was forming which resulted in 
overall land gain until the turn of this century (Coleman 
and Gagliano, 1964). Delta building forces consist of 
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additional amounts of sediment being deposited before the 
delta sinks and the arrival in the sediment load of 
nutrients that allow the establishment of plant growth. As 
nutrient rich sediment loads nourish coastal wetlands, land 
building occurs which is called accretion. As a final 
protection against land loss force the bed load (large river 
bottom sediment) gradually forms barrier islands off the 
coast. Barrier islands, which have also been subject to 
increased land loss, perform a crucial function in 
protecting the whole coastalwetland system from being 
subject the land subsidence forces of the Gulf. 
The levee building has been followed by extensive canals 
for navigation and this disturbance increases land loss 
because the canals are not fed by marsh nourishing sediment 
from the Mississippi. To compound the problem extensive 
canals have been built to get at oil and gas deposits in the 
marsh areas. In the last century the Corps and the oil and 
gas industry built so many canals that Louisiana now has one 
quarter of all the inland navigation area in the United 
States (Midboe, 1992). In the twenties, the oil and gas 
industry began to extract these resources from the delta and 
much canal construction occurred. During the seventies the 
petroleum industry created even more canals and typically 
the canals were not filled thus increasing land loss. When 
canals are built for oil and gas wells they frequently are 
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not repaired thus increasing land loss and leaving an 
eyesore. 
The New Orleans metropolitan area along with hundreds of 
smaller delta communities are contained within the shrinking 
wetlands so the issues of land loss and sinking property are 
critical to millions of persons. Coalition member Paul 
Templet has noted in a refereed scientific journal that a 
major hurricane striking New Orleans with greatly decreased 
wetland protection from Tidal surge is a serious policy 
problem that needs re-examination (Templet and 
Meyer-Arentd,1988). Even without increased vulnerability to 
natural disasters data suggest that at least four coastal 
parishes (counties) will be under water in the next fifty 
years (Coalition to restore Coastal louisisana, 1989.) 
Davis (1990) noted that Hurricane Camille, a 1969 force five 
that missed a direct hit on New Orleans, caused many deaths 
from flooding by just grazing it. While Camille went past 
the area and struck between Pass Christian and Gulfport 
Mississippi, it caused a twenty foot tidal surge that struck 
st. Bernard Parish just below New Orleans, an area that had 
experienced significant land loss. Most of the Louisiana 
deaths from that storm happened there. Mazmanian and 
Nienaber (1979) used this storm's aftermath to build one of 
a series of five case studies on Corps of Engineers 
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community involvement efforts. It showed public rage at the 
continuance of a thirty-year navigation canal project known 
as MR-GO (Mississippi River - Gulf Outlet). 
Angry residents believed MR-GO conveyed tidal water from 
Camille to St. Bernard Parish and that extension of this 
canal was a great threat to them. They went to a public 
meeting to express this strong feeling to their congressman. 
Congressman Hebert, {HAY-BEAR) who was trying to push the 
Corps of Engineers project as a boon to development, left 
public life rather than ever again subjecting himself to the 
treatment he received by the voters at the open meeting 
(Mazmanian and Nienaber, 1979). At the same time then 
Governor Edwin Edwards -- a Hebert friend -- was trying to 
impress the same assembly with the need for the Corps water 
project which would improve navigation to New Orleans. 
II. THE NEED FOR MORE INFORMATION 
Michael Osborne commented on why he thought the scientists 
testified and became politically involved and provided an 
insight into the motivations of Coalition ecologists. 
OSBORNE: " ••• its validating their science and 
putting their science to use, making it pragmatic 
rather than academic, I mean the article you write in 
the international journal ••• or something. It gets 
bounced around. It gets criticized because you did a 
two-year study instead of a three year study. You 
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started your study and had a hurricane come down in the 
middle of it. . " 
"Of course there are many scientists who believe it is 
beneath the dignity of a scientist and inappropriate 
for any scientist to assert his views in sort of a 
political form, it's demeaning." 
But scientists associated with the Coalition wanted to work 
and collaborate with the lawyers and did not feel demeaned. 
They made numerous public contributions so that their 
findings would be given to government and the public. John 
Day, noted earlier, helped James Tripp write "Here Today, 
Gone Tomorrow?" as did Paul Templet. Day helped Tripp and 
Osborne in the Avoyelles case mentioned previously. Day 
invited James Tripp to an LSU symposium in October 1985 
where Tripp called for the Coalition. John Day and other 
associates made contributions on the consequences of coastal 
land loss that still serve as benchmark work and used the 
data to advocate for policy changes (Craig et al.'s 1979). 
Yet here there is a great divide in scientific opinion that 
illustrates another one of the incentives of Coalition 
scientists. Government money for research on restoration 
programs known as marsh management by the Louisiana 
department of natural resources DNR have created doubts in 
the moinds of many ecologists. The ecologists of the 
Coalition see marsh management as a band aid approach and 
may even be harmful (Herkes, 1994). The remedies of the 
Coalition are more research on marsh management options and 
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perhaps more expensive sediment diversion projects that may 
impinge on navigation and oil and gas interests. Day 
commented on marsh management and state government in the 
spring of 1992 for this work: 
DAY: 11 ••• Part of the impetus for the Coastal 
Coalition was not only the fact that there was a 
critical land loss. Everybody knew that, but that the 
feeling that a lot of government programs were simply 
misdirected. They were bogged down in governmental 
bureaucracy, and this is the kind of thing I want you 
to cover me on. What I would think (and a number of 
people have said the same thing) is that mythologies 
have built up about what ought to be done and some of 
them are just plain wrong." 
HANNY: "In terms of marsh management?" 
DAY: "Yes, exactly. 11 
HANNY: "Impoundments II 
DAY: "Impoundments and ... partially because of the 
pressures of the Coalition a big study was funded. 
Maybe you've heard about it: The Minerals Management 
service and Myself and Don Cahoon, you've heard his 
name, and Herb Mendelson, who is a scientist at LSU and 
some others. We went in and actually looked at these 
marshes. We looked at two areas ... 11 
11 ••• a lot of what we found was directly 
contradictory to what people had said these marsh 
management plans actually accomplished." 
Interviewed extensively for this work, Paul Templet had 
recently returned as a professor of environmental studies at 
Louisiana State in March 1992, after being the Secretary of 
Environmental Quality under former Governor Buddy Roemer who 
had just lost the election to Governor Edwin Edwards (the 
man who was for the MR-GO project as Governor in the 
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1970's), who had made a come back. Since Templet has 
published on coastal land restoring over twenty years and 
has been in and out of government besides his Coalition 
work, he was asked to comment on standards for scientific 
evidence when making public policy decisions on wetlands. 
After mentioning Al Gore's "Earth in the Balance" Templet 
was prompted to comment on how government institutions 
should respond to the weight of scientific evidence. 
TEMPLET: "You do what scientists do. You look for the 
refereed literature and you see what that is telling 
you. Right now, the refereed literature is 
saying,'Sediment diversion. Sediment in the marsh is 
the solution to the problem.' If you ask the marsh 
management people [state officials in the Louisiana 
Department of Natural Resources], 'show me a paper in 
the refereed journal that says that marsh management 
works', they can't point to one. So it's pretty clear. 
That's how our science works. That is, you're supposed 
to publish your results, put it out there for everybody 
to see and criticize, and if it holds up, you are 
probably right. If that hasn't been done then you 
gotta wonder about the case." 
So the scientists associated with the Coalition have worked 
with the lawyers for years in Baton Rouge and elsewhere to 
change the attitude and direction of the government and what 
they regard as a quick fix of giving government millions for 
marsh management projects. 
III. INCENTIVES: GOOD SCIENCE FOR TENURED FACULTY OR MONEY 
FOR MARSH MANAGEMENT AT STATE AGENCIES 
Professors with tenure need to get research published that 
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pass:es the scientific scrutiny of peer review. The solidary 
benefit of sci-entific credibility is a motivating factor 
which allows, them to communicate in the special dialogue 
with oth-er scientists. It would be a material benefit if the 
scientists did not have tenure. The greatest benefit that 
Louisiana state University can receive is a reputation of 
strong scientific credibility, an arbiter of technical 
questions for society. 
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GRASSROOTS INCENTIVES 
My Dear Brothers in Christ: 
I would like to encourage you to attend 
the meeting of the Louisiana Coastal 
Wetlands Interfaith Stewardship Plan. 
As you well know, much of our Diocese 
is at risk of disappearing under water 
in the next fifty years. We have lost 
much already. We need not accept this. 
As a matter of fact, we are morally 
obligated, as stewards of God's gifts, 
to protect and restore our coastal 
wetlands. I will be attending and hope 
that you can join me and our brothers 
and sisters from other denominations. 
Letter of catholic Bishop Warren 
Boudreaux to the Priests of the 
Houma-Thibodaux Diocese, February 1989 
Some people are more directly impacted by coastal wetland loss 
than others but they still needed to be mobilized into an 
organization. The organized Coalition starts at Michael 
Osborne's Prytania street law office in New Orleans. James 
T.B. Tripp, of EDF in New York, Osborne and Professor Oliver 
Houck of Tulane, pressed for a local organization using 
Osborne's law off ice. Osborne recognized that the ingredients 
of a local organization could be created through his friends 
in the Sierra Club, the Louisiana Wildlife Federation as well 
as some of his clients, such as the Catholic Church associated 
Organization of Louisiana Fisherman that had recieved 
leadership training from Rob Gorman Associate Director of 
Catholic Social Services. While it was Tripp of the 
Environmental Defense Fund who pressed for the creation of the 
Coalition in 1985 and shepherded the writing of "Here Today, 
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Gone Tomorrow?, 11 it was Osborne's understanding of personal 
chemistry among local people that caused the Coalition to 
start in early 1986. Osborne was the intersection between 
local and national groups on the road to the Coalition. 
The mobilization for a formal organization followed Tripp's 
October 1985 call for a Coalition at a wetlands symposium at 
Louisiana State organized by Professor John Day. When asked 
who started the Coalition Professor Paul Templet said: 
TEMPLET: "Well I think Tripp was the motivating force. 
Oliver Houck was one of the motivating forces. Then the 
technical people got involved." 
" • he and Tripp were instrumental. And then the 
technical people like John Day and myself, and we can 
agree on what the solutions are to be, and then Tripp 
gave us a vision of what the institutional arrangements 
ought to be, and if you got those two things together 
your in pretty good shape." 
Osborne invited people that became a small working group which 
eventually facilitated a coordinated movement to induce 
thousands of Louisiana citizens to contact their elected 
leaders. All of this transpired with the assistance of Houck 
who filed the incorporation papers and who operated 
conveniently across town at Tulane Law School which Osborne 
had graduated from 26 years before. 
The coalition was the final amalgamation built and 
executed conjointly by the lawyers and the scientists with 
leadership from Tripp. It provided coordination of organized 
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people who had similar interests and who could eventually 
exert organized and synchronized pressure on government. As 
Oliver Houck said when asked about who the lawyers wanted to 
recruit into the Coalition in a April 1992 interview for this 
research: 
HOUCK: "In terms of the local people, we had people that 
we knew we wanted involved, but one of them ran a 
Catholic services and another would be doing scientific 
work out of Baton Rouge. They didn't talk to each otn.er. 
They didn't know each other, and there wasn't any central 
unifying theme for coastal land restoring ... " 
In terms of the leadership and structure of the Coalition 
Houck said: 
HOUCK: "It's less a coalition of groups. It's almost 
built from the top down. It was the brain child of Jim 
[James T.B.Tripp] and it was imposed on in a, not in a 
coercive way, but a persuasive way. It was imposed 
top-down by Jim on people who thought it was a good idea 
and then took the ball and ran with it but it remains the 
idea of maybe 5 or 6 people who implement it." 
Early in 1986 Osborne began to hold meetings in his 
fourth floor conference room on Prytania street. Following 
his pattern of twenty years of legal collaboration, Tripp was 
at the table as was Houck, John Day, Paul Templet and a few 
other interested persons. The meetings were almost bi-weekly 
and included discussions of what goals should be placed in an 
organization publication as well as who should be invited. 
Sierra Club members, Sarah and Harold Schoeffler, who 
were friends of Osborne, showed up at the meetings. Sarah 
Schoeffler was active in the Methodist church in Lafayette 
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and had community organizing skills that were to prove 
invaluable. Harold Scho.effler owns a Cadillac dealership in 
Lafayette and provided the expertise of a successful 
businessman. Templet was asked to recall how the Schoefflers 
got involved. 
TEMPLET: "He [Harold Schoeffler] had been doing Sierra 
Club stuff for years, and I knew about him, but I didn't 
know that much about him, and then, I didn't know Gorman 
at all, like I said. I met him at one of the first 
meetings of the Coalition." 
In May 1986 Osborne invited Rob Gorman, the Assistant 
Director of Catholic Social Services in Houma to attend the 
meetings. The Schoefflers and Gorman represented two 
different modes of established local organization which 
enhanced the structure of the developing Coalition. Gorman 
had already organized local fisherman in Terrebonne and 
Lafrouche Parishes through a series of one on one meetings 
that turned into group meetings. The Schoefflers were a part 
of another religious network that turned into a mass awareness 
and letter writing campaign called the Interfaith Stewardship 
Plan. German's mode of organizing was a few hundred dedicated 
fisherman who could be counted on in litigation and to show up 
at meetings. The Interfaith Stewardship was an organized 
multi church meeting program. 
Gorman had worked with Osborne trying to get justice for 
coastal fisherman who had been locked out of their 
96 
traditional fishing areas in the area of Houma and Bayou 
Lafrouche. Since the move by corporations to lock fisherman 
out was the result of terrain changes caused by wetland 
decline in a case called the "Tidewater Canal," the lawyers 
thought that they might enlist the fisherman and others 
through German's encouragement in the effort to restore 
wetlands. Moreover, Gorman represented the Catholic Church in 
an area that was heavily catholic. Together with the 
Methodist inspired Interfaith Stewardship lead by Sarah 
Schoeffler, the religious organizations represented an 
untapped resource to mobilize people for coastal land 
restoring. Both Gorman and the Schoeffler's efforts overlapped 
each other. The grassroots groups like the Organization of 
Louisiana Fishermen and the Interfaith Stewardship provided 
what science and law could not -- organized community support 
·directed at elected officials and agencies. 
The Organization of Louisiana Fisherman grew out of the 
declining marshes of Terrebonne and Lafrouch parishes and got 
a push from Catholic Social Services in the Houma-Thibodaux 
diocese. Gorman's job required helping with the social needs 
of coastal parishioners such as providing food to needy 
families. Fishermen were putting increased pressure on 
catholic Social Services for assistance because they were 
getting removed from their economic base of fishing and 
shrimping. 
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The culture of coastal Louisiana presents some unique 
problems for outsiders to get people organized and 
pressuring government. Fisherman and shrimpers in coastal 
parishes put most of their money into boats. They live 
usually in small modest houses and their income comes from 
their catch, al though when furs were fashionable, .Joel 
Laparouse of Cocodrie stated in April 1992, that he use to 
trap in the winter and receive an additional income 
(Laparouse, 1992). In communities like Golden Meadow, French 
is still spoken, an outsider (the author) can go into a 
quick-stop in Chauvin, which is also a bayou boat stop, and 
get food while whole groups of patrons speak in French. 
The potential cultural barriers of the community were overcome 
by Gorman. Since 1978, the fisherman here have endured 
economic problems in an area of great abundance, because many 
of them are now denied access to traditional fishing areas. 
Some have been arrested for trespassing into areas where large 
corporations now stake out and control access (Gorman, 1992). 
Arrests have occurred as recently as 1992 when this field work 
was conducted. Yet they have fished here for years gaining 
access through the public trust doctrine which and when a 
marsh area changes, such as when a canal closes off or is 
cordoned off by an oil business, they stumble across a company 
asserting its new "rights." Large corporations, many of which 
are headquartered out of the state, take advantage of the 
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changing terrain features and claim enhanced property rights. 
Shortly after Gorman became Assistant Director of Social 
Service, the catholic Church recieved grants from the Bishops 
Campaign for Human Development, the goal of which is to 
improve peoples lives through militating for social justice 
issues. Gorman related how he helped fisherman to organize 
that he eventually represented at Osborne's office during an 
interview conducted on the Army's Mississippi high water 
inspection. Gorman was asked how his people were organized in 
the spring of 1992, during the inspection which is a day long 
trip down the Mississippi River: 
GORMAN: 11 ! work with Catholic Social Services and what 
we do is a combination of social services, which is 
helping people in need, and what we call social justice 
work, which is changing unjust institutions ... 11 
11 when I first got there in 1982 we'd been, 
setting up a food bank, helping people who were out of 
food. Well, around 1983 or so, we started noticing 
fisherman coming by to get food and that was very 
unusual." 
"Fisherman are pretty independent guys. People were 
telling us it was unusual to see fisherman coming in, so 
what we did was, in any organizing what you do is one to 
one meetings. That is the building block of any 
organizing effort, is a one on one meeting, 
where you try to find out just what's going on and see 
what are the common threads .... " 
"Well, as we'd do these one on one interviews, what we 
were finding was the fishermen had had a poor trawl 
season, that was one thing, but also they were being 
locked out of waterways that they traditionally used. We 
started saying, 'Well, its fine to give these folks food, 
but we also need to look at the root causes of the 
injustice that's causing them now to come to the food 
bank in the first place.' One of the problems is they 
can't fish where they used to fish because land owners 
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are locking them out." 
"So we started saying, 'Well, maybe we ought to help the 
fisherman do something .. '" 
HANNY: "And by this time, you have a population [ of 
fishermen] whom you have met on a one to one basis?" 
GORMAN: "Right." 
HANNY: "Who works with you when you do that? Was it just 
you or do you have a staff?" 
GORMAN: "It's just me in this case. Working with the 
director of our agency who was working with me on some 
of the interviews, and a field rep from the Campaign for 
Human Development was going on some of the interviews." 
HANNY: ''How many interviews . . . ? 11 
GORMAN: "Oh, maybe 20 or 30. 11 
GORMAN: "Just local folks. At a pivotal meeting there 
was a guy named Herman Dardar [fisherman] and he invited 
me to his house. One of the people on our board had said, 
'Herman's the man you need to talk to.' so, I called 
Herman who I didn't know from the man on the moon, he 
lives in Golden Meadow, and I said, 'Herman your name has 
been given to me. Could I come down and meet with you?' 
Herman doesn't speak a lot of English. His English is 
Okay but he prefers French. He says, 'Yeah, come on 
down.' When I said I was with the church, that made me 
kind of okay because it's a real Catholic area. So, he 
said 'I 1 ll sit down with you.'" 
"I was expecting to do a one on one. When I get into 
his living room, there's about 10 or 15 really tough 
looking guys. Some of them are Indian, some of them are 
Cajun guys, most of them are speaking French when I walk 
in. Nobody's speaking English. I walked into the room, 
this young white dude from up north and my only entree 
is that I work for the church and they are all Catholic, 
and I said, 'I'm here to listen to whats going on.' 
So they started telling me about all these problems, and 
I said, 'Well, what are you doing about it?' They said, 
'You know, its hard to do anything.'" 
"So I said 'there are two ways to get power. One is if 
you have money, and one is if you have numbers.' 
and you all don't have a lot of money but you have a lot 
of numbers. Do you have any organizations down here?' 
They said 'No, there used to be one called The 
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Organization of Louisiana Fishermen, but its kind of on 
the ropes. It hasn't been doing much.' I said, 'Well, 
why don't we see what we can do about that.' 
"So Herman's son Isadore [Isadore Dardar], and I started 
going around doing one on one's with the fishermen and 
we called a meeting at the fire hall in Galiano." 
HANNY: "This is 82-83?'' 
GORMAN: "Yes, probably 83-84. Its not 82. Isadore is a 
local guy. A trawler. Everybody knows him. He'd go 
around speaking French to all the fishermen. I'd sort of 
nod my head and say, 'we really need to organize' and 
listen to what they were saying, and say 'Well if you 
want to keep getting locked out do nothing. If you want 
to do something about it, you better get together, and 
there's an organization called The Organization of 
Louisiana Fisherman that had been active for a while but 
now, its sort of dead, but the organization structure is 
still there and that could be a big one.' So, we called 
a meeting and we had about 150 fishermen show up at the 
meeting." 
" . Right there they elected some officers and said, 
'lets do something.'" 
After that description Gorman allowed how they worked 
together: 
GORMAN: " . we had all those fishermen and I just 
acted as an organizer, sort of giving them leadership 
training along the way on how to run a meeting and how to 
research issues, how to access the resources. I meanwhat 
they wanted to do was focus on this place calledthe 
Tidewater Canal, and open it up. So, I put them in touch 
with Legal Aid. I remember at one of the early meetings 
... I was sitting on a crab trap, on a dock ... we 
were all sitting on crab traps listening to this lawyer 
from Legal Aid talk about how we were all 
going to open this thing up." 
Legal Aid did not prove to be a successful means for the 
fishermen to reopen access to the Tidewater Canal and the 
Organization of Louisiana Fishermen hired Michael Osborne. 
Gorman described how he found Michael Osborne through a 
Jesuit attorney. 
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GORMAN: "So we contacted Mike. Mike got hired. Then 
Legal Aid got cold feet and backed out after about six 
months or a year. In the meantime we had also brought in 
the Attorney General's office through Kai Miboe." 
When asked at Prytania street how he found Gorman which is 
about an hour away from New Orleans, Osborne said: 
OSBORNE: "We immediately identified each other as soul 
brothers, • . . [the] thing that sticks out in my mind is 
he [Gorman] was concerned about the social problems that 
came from coastal deterioration and the anti-public 
trust movement .•. as he put it to me in one 
of the very early conversations, he said 'we have 
parishioners who have been self sufficient for 
generations and whose family have been self sufficient 
for generations and now they're coming and saying can't 
we please give them some money because the daughter's 
going to be starting school and doesn't have any shoes?' 
So started the professional relationship with the 
fishermen through Gorman that Osborne could call on later 
when creating the Coalition. Gorman related how he got 
involved in the Coalition: 
GORMAN: "So anyway we weren't involved in this wetland 
stuff ••. strictly access and then Jim Tripp from EDF 
came down, and he and Osborne have known each other, as 
I told you, for years, and found that the environmental 
groups were here, the landowners and everybody else were 
over here, and there was nobody who could bring them 
together, because everybody was pigeon holed. So Osborne 
got me into it, by saying, 'If we don't have the wetlands 
anymore, your fishermen don't have jobs.' That made sense 
so I went to some meetings and eventually because of my 
position with the church, they figured, I could be sort 
of a neutral coalition builder." 
With Gorman on board and attending meetings at Osborne's 
office, the lawyers had brought the resources of the catholic 
Church along with the Scheofflers. Gorman and the 
Scheofflers got the Catholic Diocese and the Methodist 
Conference to pass resolutions to protect and restore coastal 
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wetlands in 1987. 
The catholic Bishop's resolution was crucial because it put 
coastal wetland organization in Rob Gorman's job description 
thus allowing him to devote official duties to the effort. 
After his church's resolution, Gorman began to go to work on 
community organization for the Coalition, and Sarah 
Schoeffler started a drive to hold meetings across coastal 
Louisiana in all churches. At the end of her effort in 1989 
she had a mailing list of over 1500 people in different 
denominations spread across the coast. Gorman commented on 
the Schoeffler effort: 
GORMAN: "The real credit for that [Interfaith 
Stewardship] goes to Sarah Scheoffler, [she] was the 
person who really did the ground work on that. I was 
involved in this environmental work. OK. And I figured 
••• I really needed to know where the church stands on 
this. You know, I'd really like to have some back-up for 
this kind of work. I don't know if the bishops are with 
are with me on it, so I wrote a reso1 ution for the 
Louisiana catholic Conference to get the bishops to pass 
about wetlands. how it was a social justice issue, a 
moral issue, and they passed it unanimously, and just 
about blew me off my seat." 
"So that gave me backing and I went to the Methodist 
pastor, who was a friend of mine, and said 'why don't you 
do the same thing?' "I said [to him] 'the Methodists have 
great social justice writings in history, so why don't 
you do something with wetlands?'" 
That was in 1987 and Gorman's Methodist friend mentioned the 
Scheofflers. 
GORMAN: " •.• he said' I know a woman in Lafayette 
who is real active. Sarah Schoeffler. Let's get Sarah.' 
I had some language in there [ the resolution J about 
organizing, but at the time, I really didn't have the 
time to organize the churches. so Sarah came in and said 
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'Lets organize the churches.' She promoted it. John 
[Gorman' s Methodist friend] presented it to the Methodist 
church and they passed it, and several other 
denominations passed it, but Sarah was really the one 
that took the bull by the horns and said 'Well lets 
organize this thing.' .•. 'its just a piece of paper 
right now, you know, and Rob you're out there doing your 
thing, but lets get the churches as churches involved in 
setting up an organization.' I had brought Catholic 
Social Services into the Coalition. But Sarah said, 'Lets 
get all the churches into an organization and 
really look at the theology of this.'" 
The Scheoffler Interfaith effort was systematic and 
involved many more people than the Organization of Louisiana 
Fishermen. At Interfaith church meetings were scientists and 
others in the Coalition who gave a presentation on coastal 
wetland loss and then showed the participants how to contact 
their elected representatives. She included a sample letter 
to send to U.S. Senators and House members and 
representatives in the State Legislature concerning coastal 
wetland loss. 
The connection between religiosity, fishing and politi.cs was 
captured in this work by a visit to a Mass at 9:00 o'clock in 
the morning for the Spring 1992. The Boat Blessing on the 
banks of Boudreaux canal in Chauvin, Louisiana, started an 
annual event that lasted all day and culminated in an eating 
and drinking party of over two hundred fishing boats on Lake 
Boudreaux. Boat Blessings are held every spring in coastal 
towns to bless the fleet for a safe and bountiful season. 
Losing ones family in the Gulf is a remote yet serious 
consideration in the area. Almost all boats are taken on 
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parade and blessed by the village priest. At the Cocodrie boat 
blessing, Monsignor Fred Brunet conducted the service which 
connected the main industry -- fishing -- with biblical 
passages. The need for the residents of coastal Louisiana to 
use the ecosystem for their subsistence is clearly intertwined 
in the sermon which keys on Christ's resurrection and what the 
apostles (who like many local residents were fisherman) did 
with Christ's crucifixion. The service was attended by over 
many people with a small cajun band that played Amazing Grace 
with two singers, an electric guitar and zedeyco style 
accordion. 
BRUNET: "So he went back home to Galilee on the Lake of 
Gannessaret and the angel told them at the tomb, he said 
'go to Galilee, the Lord has gone there before you, he 
will see you again.'" 
"And so they went back home, and we get the impression, 
you know, in spite of all the wonderful things that had 
happened, life had to continue and they had to go back 
home and face the daily routine, not only Easter Sunday 
but the Monday. And as they get back into their routine, 
I'm sure there were many thoughts and questions in their 
minds, ... well what are we to do about all of this?" 
"Christ has come, he preached, he has taught, he has been 
resurrected from the dead, he has appeared to us, but 
what are we to do? And as they were thinking about all 
this, they are back home in Galilee, and John says 
something I think we can all relate to: 'I'M GO'IN 
FISHIN!' ... Thats what he said'I'm goin fishin!' •.• 
And the others too said: 'wer'e going with you!' And so 
they go back out on the lake, and they fish all night, 
and they catch nothin. And then, early in the morning, as 
the dawn is breaking, there's a stranger on the shore and 
he says to them, 'cast your nets on the starboard side.' 
That wasn't unusual because many times in that area they 
didn't have to fish to far off shore and sometimes those 
on shore could see better the movement of the fish, than 
they could from the boat. So they did as the stranger 
suggested, they threw their nets, but when they caught SO 
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MANY fish after having caught nothing all night, a light 
went on and John in the boat says, as he looks back at 
the shore, 'it's the Lord!' ... I'm sure that morning 
when John saw that, and looked back at the shore, he said 
'it's the Lord.' They recognized him in the catch. In 
that first catch ... " 
After repeated fishing analogies Brunet concludes: 
" recognize Jesus in the catch, in the fish, in the 
shrimp, in the providing for us, have that faith in him, 
and then share that with our families, our community, our 
church, and brothers and sisters. Then this day I think, 
will take on a much more beautiful and deeper meaning for 
us. As we bless the fleet today and ask Gods help that 
they will have a safe season, and that they will have a 
most profitable season, so that they can, in turn, share 
and feed our community." 
The scientists, the lawyers and the local groups 
were now part of the Prytania Street organization. The 
initial meetings included Randy Lanctot of the of the 
Louisiana Wildlife Federation -- a Baton Rouge resident 
the Schoefflers from Lafayette, Drs. Paul Templet and John 
Day as well as Houck and Tripp. The meetings centered on 
three themes: organizational progress in terms of financial 
support, a not-for profit incorporated organization 
structure with a staff located near the capital in Baton 
Rouge, and the writing of the Coalition's "Here Today, Gone 
Tomorrow?," the organization's plan. 
Throughout 1986 and 1987 the meetings continued and efforts 
and fundraising began. Gorman and Sarah Schoeffler began their 
efforts with mostly their own resources based upon a 
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preliminary draft of ''Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?." It was 
agreed that the group would apply for section 501 (c) 3 
not-for-profit status and James Tripp began to put together 
the basis for "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?'' Houck and some of 
his associates at Tulane started the incorporation process at 
this time. 
Throughout 1986 and 1987 the Coalition continued to meet 
and much of the work was carried out by the board members. 
Meeting and planning "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" consumed 
most of their time and there developed a consensus that a 
permanent office of paid staff would have to be situated in 
Baton Rouge. But the organization required an income and 
that commenced a search for funding that continues today. 
Tripp made available his contacts in New York who were 
members of the Rockefeller Family Trust and the Tortuga 
Foundation which resulted in start up matching funds in the 
amount of $50,000. Lanctote made available the bank account 
of the Wildlife Federation to keep incoming grant money. 
December 1987, the first recorded meeting of the 
Coalition took place. Houck reviewed the progress of the 
incorporation process. Gorman was selected as the 
organization's chairman of the board. There were twenty two 
people that attended the meeting. Besides the Schoefflers, 
Tripp and Houck and a few legal colleagues, Osborne had also 
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invited Paul Kemp, a coastal Geologist from Louisiana State 
who specialized in the chenier plain and David Chambers a 
wetland scientist who studied nekton communities in brackish 
water. Kemp promoted elaborate plans of restoring damaged 
wetlands in the Coalition meetings which served as a 
communications center for interested scientists and government 
officials. Among the ideas Kemp advanced were the use of 
existing oil pipelines to transport discarded sediment to 
provide for marsh nourishment. 
Financial commitments were recorded for several of the 
attendees. Dr. Barry Kohl and Tripp described their progress 
on the draft mission statement and the rest of the meeting 
was devoted to fundraising. 
The federal and state governments were targeted in 
January 1988, for education efforts on the need for coastal 
restoration legislation. Tripp recommended that a contact be 
made with Ed Osann, an attorney for the National Wildlife 
Federation in Washington and that a permanent liaison be 
maintained between Osann and the Coalition. Randy Lanctot, 
whose Louisiana Wildlife Federation was in Baton Rouge, 
chaired a committee to coordinate legislative and executive 
I 
efforts at the state level in Baton Rouge. 
With respect to a state legislation the group wanted an 
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office of coastal restoration set up preferably in the 
Department of Environmental Quality. Also they resolved that 
a funding source for this purpose be created through a tax on 
state mineral revenue, and that pollution from oil and gas 
activities into coastal wetlands be eliminated. 
In February preparations were underway for a forum at 
the National Wildlife Federation Conference in New Orleans. 
The Coalition sponsored the forum entitled "Coastal Louisiana, 
Here Today, Gone Tomorrow" with Randy Lanctot and Ed Osann as 
moderators. Work continued on the document the Coalition 
was putting together and the Scheofflers and Gorman continued 
to talk and meet with groups across the state. 
The group selected a community organizer and received 
free office space in Baton Rouge where the meetings switched 
from Osborne's law office. While the community organizer was 
getting acquainted with his responsibilities, Gorman and 
Sarah Schoef.fler were already at work state wide to alert the 
public and drum up support. In addition, the group got booth 
space at the Republican National Convention in New Orleans in 
the summer of 1988 to press their cause. 
At a meeting on the twenty first of June 1988 the 
legislative chairman Randy Lanctot said the session "yielded 
a big zero" in terms of accomplishments for the Coalition. 
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The Coalition thought a better strategy might be to set up a 
coastal restoration office directly inside the Governor's 
office. Several members wanted to schedule a press conference 
to express dissatisfaction with the legislature's and the 
administrations lack of support. 
In September, state Senator Ben Bagert, a New Orleans 
attorney, began to attend meetings and Jim Tripp continued to 
commute from New York. Louisiana Governor Buddy Roemer had 
changed his party affiliation to Republican and Bagert was one 
of his friends in the legislature. Bagert reported to the 
Coalition membership that he was getting "good vibes" from the 
Governor's office and that he thought a position for coastal 
restoration could be created through the Governor's office. He 
then read a letter to Roemer that spelled out a bill he would 
introduce to make the Governor's position permanent, have the 
office oversee all coastal restoration in other state 
departments and create a tax for restoration. Bagert's bill 
would allow a part of the objectives in "Here Today, Gone 
Tomorrow?" to happen. At the same meeting Tripp argued for a 
concerted effort on the Louisiana Congressional delegation. 
By February 1989 the final edition of "Here Today, Gone 
Tomorrow" was developed and in print. Much of the shepherding 
of the document was handled by Tripp, although Day and 
Templet played major roles in developing the technical 
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objectives. Templet had earlier developed an area wide 
management approach to coastal restoration which had 
summarized many of the remedies in "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow" 
and provided a framework for moving ahead (Templet and 
Meyer-Arendt, 1988). 
TEMPLET: "They [EDF and James T.B. Tripp] can't do it all 
from New York. So Tripp's role in this was to see the 
bigger picture, and once he had, he could see that there 
needed to be an organization that could continually put 
its efforts into guiding state and federal agencies to do 
the right thing for wetlands. And the way he saw to do 
that was to get the technical people to agree on aset of 
solutions, which he did, and he wrote that report, and I 
helped him and some others helped him. In fact in 1988, 
I did this paper, which I' 11 give you a copy of, and 
Tripp used this as a kind of springboard to pull together 
some probable solution from which came the first report." 
HANNY: "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" 
TEMPLET: "Yes, that was it." 
The incentives of the fisherman and the religious groups to 
support the Coalition are both material, purposive and 
solidary. People need to eat and care for their families. The 
church needs parishioners and not be drained of its resources 
completely. Osborne needed to build an organization for 
national policy goals that he, Tripp and Houck shared and were 
discussed before. Osborne used his existing environmental 
relationships to help create the entity called the Coalition. 
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STATE CAPITAL NETWORK 
I. COALITION MEMBERS WHO WORK AROUND THE STATE LEGISLATURE 
What happened around the state capital and the federal 
government to persuade government to adopt Coalition positions 
demonstrates another closely knit group of Coalition people 
who work around the state capital complex in Baton Rouge. New 
Orleans State Senator Ben Bagert developed the legislation. He 
had gotten Candidate George Bush to make a no net loss of 
wetlands pledge at the 1988 Republican National Convention in 
New Orleans. Bagert leads off describing in an interview in 
his office on the twentieth floor of the Pan Am building in 
New Orleans how the Coalition came to work with him: 
BAGERT: "See that little brochure that I had put out 
[coastal wet1ands' primer for the lay public]?" 
HANNY: "That had a bunch of pictures?" 
BAGERT: "Yes. What I found was that I needed some sort of 
primer. That brochure to me was like a catalyst. What it 
did was gave people who knew that there was a problem, 
didn't know exactly what the problem was, some sort of 
better understanding of what the problem was and it gave 
them something to talk both to each other, to write about 
to various opinion-making organizations, which is 
newspapers, call-in talk shows and then also it gave them 
something, some information, new information to draw upon 
when they petitioned their elected officials, wrote 
letters to their legislators, senator, representatives." 
HANNY: "There are a couple of things I'm trying to get 
after ... you seem to be at an important crossroads 
on the coalition's road. I was wondering if you could 
tell me why you did this and why you have an interest in 
this stuff and, and what were the mechanics of the bill 
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that you led the charge for?" 
BAGERT: " .•• never quit on fishing, which dates back to 
my boyhood in Gentilly. I've been hunting less and 
fishing more and I started seeing the result in loss of 
these things especially when I got active in fishing 
again back in the early 80's." 
" . but the key thing was that I had to find this 
little island and when I went back after the spring and 
the summer was over and I switched back to the other side 
of the river, this island which was about a half acre in 
size was gone. It was dark that morning and the sun 
hadn't come up and I thought I had gotten lost and some 
how run aground. A lot of trouble, messed up my motor 
and I was terribly annoyed when I found out that I was on 
top of the island and it was no more. That was when I 
decided that I was going to do something about it. That 
happened in 1986." 
"The first legislation that I filed during the session 
was either 1986 or 1987, but I got my brains beat in, I 
was ostracized by the president of the Senate [Sammy 
Nunez]. At the time I thought that since his District 
had a lot of wetlands and since he was involved w:j..th oil 
and gas and distributors, his exclusive domain shouldn't 
be mine, Johnny come lately. The bill that I filed was 
a bill that dealt with requiring mitigation and there 
were wetlands by people who destroy the wetlands for 
their economic benefit. That bill didn't pass. I got 
killed for that." 
HANNY: "When the Act finally, I think, what [they] call 
Act 6 finally went through you had folks join you didn't 
you?" 
BAGERT: "Yes, what I recognized was that I had no public 
support for myself. I had to go to the people and make 
this an issue, educate the people in Louisiana and then 
having done that, go back with my legislation. The 
biggest piece of legislation I think that I ever passed 
got no notoriety at all, no one knew anything about it." 
Coalition members Rob Gorman and Eloise Wall of Citizens for 
a Clean Environment described how the bill passed. 
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HANNY: "Now when it came time for a constitutional 
amendment [state amendment to protect the wetland trust 
fund which was a part of the bill that passed] and other 
coalition achievements did you do anything with this 
group of people [Organization of Louisiana Fishermen]?" 
GORMAN: "Yes. There were several major issues to work 
on, one of those was the constitutional amendment, the 
other was national legislation, and so the 
constitutional amendment, we kept working with the 
legislators, and then one of them, Ben Bagert, 
introduced this constitutional amendment ... " 
" ... the coalition isn't the only group that got that 
through, but it wouldn't have gone through without us, 
and a pivotal piece there was that Ben [Bagert] was 
pushing this legislation and we were up there [at the 
state legislature] trying to educate people about the· 
importance of it .. 11 
Bagert's bill was sitting in the Louisiana Senate going 
nowhere in the spring of 1989. The Coalition members Paul 
Kemp and Rob Gorman met Eloise Wall, who lives in the state 
capital and spends much of her time lobbying on environmental 
issues for her organization: Citizens for a Clean 
Environment. Eloise Wall, like Randy Lanctote knew all of the 
important legislators at the state capital and had worked 
with them for over 7 years. She had lived in Baton Rouge 
for over 26 years. Wall started Citizens for a Clean 
Environment and got Paul Templet on its board. Even though 
Wall had an emphasis on pollution policy she embraced the 
problems associated with ecosystem restoration in coastal 
wetlands. 
Wall recognized why the previous year the Coalition had 
been unsuccessful and also why Bagert's bill was going 
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nowhere. The legislature did not understand the problem and 
Bagert, an aspiring politician whom George Bush had asked to 
run against David Duke in the Republican primary, was envied 
by many. Wall described the scene: 
WALL: "Ben Bagert had a meeting of a focus group. Ben 
was the one who was basically the brains behind this. He 
put a lot of time into it, and he had a wonderful 
booklet and he formed this group of coastal legislators, 
and I thought that this was just going to take off and 
that it was being handled." 
"My initial thing . . that must have been when Rob 
Gorman called me. I attended with someone from the 
Coalition, and Randy Lanctote from the [Louisiana] 
Wildlife Federation, this focus meeting." 
" . . . it had gotten put to the back burner so to speak, 
because a lot of stuff was going on, so Ben had this 
focus group and I went to get all the coastal 
legislators back together again. I went to the 
breakfast [part of the focus group] that morning, and I 
mean, this was a big, big issue, and when I looked 
around that room, there were not that many coastal 
legislators in that room, and I knew all the coastal 
legislators who were interested in that issue." 
Wall was disturbed that there was not more involvement from 
legislators whose constituents were going underwater. Asked 
about who was there and she said: 
WALL: "I was really really surprised that no one was 
there. And so, we left the room and then, we, Rob and I 
started talking, and then I . . . this is when I started 
to help. So I couldn't figure this out, and I went and 
asked the other legislators who had been in the room, 
'where were the other guys? ' and they said, "Well ask 
them. ' And so I did. And they said that they were just, 
for one reason or another, they were irritated with Ben 
Bagert. 11 
Wall commented more on how Bagert was responsible for the 
policy's formulation: 
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WALL: "Bagert was interested in this on his own. I mean, 
he did ... the guy should be given credit. He did a 
tremendous amount of work on this and he put together 
this wonderful booklet that anyone could understand. He 
went to Washington. He did a lot of work on this. " 
Wall then described the curious feeling she felt at the 
behavior of legislators that morning. 
WALL: "Back to the legislature. We [the Coalition] went 
about trying to get these legislators back into the focus 
group and they said they were definitely interested, but 
they were not that interested in working under Ben 
Bagert. So that was a little problem." 
The biggest problem was that a 40 year member of the 
legislature and Bagert antagonist was the head of the 
committee that Bagert's bill would have to successfully get 
through. To make matters worse, at that time he [the Senator] 
had a history of being what Wall characterized as anti-
environmental. 
WALL: "He was head of the appropriations committee where 
all the budget [ decisions J in the Senate where this would 
go and he and Bagert did not get along. Every time this 
[Bagert's bill] would come up, [the Senator] who is not 
a coastal legislator would, I mean, he has his way of 
mocking people and getting you out of his hair. He would 
not hear the bill. I mean, we went probably three times 
to his committee, had all these people up there, he just 
had a way of getting rid of it, finding something wrong 
with it, or just not hearing the bill. So I was getting 
very frustrated, so Ted Buckner of the Sierra Club 
[ lobbyist J , and I, left one of these meetings and went to 
lunch and came back and Ted was saying, 'Well do you 
really think its worth it? We've already talked to them. 
They didn't give us support on the Senate side? ' And 
then, I just said, 'what the heck, what will it hurt? 
Lets just go again.' So on the way over [to the House] 
walking across the hall, I started thinking, 'What we 
ought to do is to ask them [sympathetic legislators] to 
take it over.' And I knew, and I was really upset about 
this, this would really anger Ben, because it [the bill] 
was his baby. I said 'Ted, what do you think about asking 
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them to start it in the house? 'And he said 'I 
think it's a real good idea, but what are we going to do 
about Ben?'" 
"So we decided that was the way to go, because we felt 
the animosity between [ the Senate appropriations 
committee chairman] and Ben that it would never happen in 
the Senate, and we had a very short period of time [the 
legislative session was ending]." 
"So we got over there [to the house] and the very first 
guy I saw was Sammy Theriot, and Sammy had been at the 
focus meeting, and so we said to Sammy, 'Why is no one 
helping us? ' And he said, 'You know why.' And I said, 
'Would you all consider taking the bills and starting 
them here?' And he said, 'Oh gosh. Well, yes, I guess 
we ... 'I said, we don't have any more time and it's 
got to be done.' so, he called every coastal legislator 
that he saw on the floor right then, and there were about 
four of them altogether, and they came over and he said 
to them, 'What do you think about this?' and they said, 
'Yes, we will do it. "'So then, somebody said, 'Well it 
will never go unlesswe have the Governor.' So I saw Bob 
Munson, who was a guy who worked for the Governor, we 
called him over. He says, 'The Governor [Roemer] is 
definitely interested in this, ' and he said, 'Sammy 
[ Theriot J , you have an appointment with the Governor this 
afternoon. Why don't we discuss this? ' So that is in 
fact what happened." 
Gorman, in a separate interview validated Wall's recollection: 
GORMAN: " •.. so Ben introduces this bill, and at that 
time Ben had a reputation as kind of a maverick within 
the legislature, and sometimes other legislators would be 
against something just because Ben was for it. So, one of 
the things the Coalition had to do, and we were key in 
this, mostly Eloise Wall, was to take that bill and get 
some other legislators to have ownership of it, so it 
wasn't just Ben's bill, and Eloise played a, I can still 
remember the day, we were all up there. There were 
several of us, and Eloise was saying, 'Look, these people 
are going to kill this thing just 'cause they don't like 
Ben. We've got to get some other people and get them to 
get their name on it and they can sort of some credit for 
it. So we got to spread the credit around.'" 
HANNY: "Those majority Democrats in the legislature and 
Bagert was a Republican." 
GORMAN: "That didn't have a lot to do with it, it was 
more of personality, and they knew he was running for 
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some other kind of office and he wanted to get all the 
credit for this, and he deserves a lot of the credit for 
it, but he was not a coalition builder. So, we kind of 
took his bill and a couple of other folks attached their 
name to it, and then it started to move. When other 
people got some ownership of it, with us pushing them to 
do it, this was sort of back cigar, smoked filled rooms, 
then it moved. That was a pivotal time, that day, getting 
those other guys to get some ownership saying, 
'We'll recognize you. The Coalition will give some 
recognition to other legislators who endorse this. We're 
not tied just to Ben Bagert, Ok. We want you guys to 
share the glory for this. This is a wonderful thing. It 
will do great things. We'll heap praise on you.' And 
they did, and we did, and the sucker passed through the 
legislature, and Ben still had a lot of ownership of it. 
And then it had to go public [as a constitutional 
amendment] and the state had to vote for it, and 
everybody was working on that. The coalition didn't play 
the key role in getting it out to the public. We were 
just one of·the players. One of the many players, in 
getting it passed. And damn, if the thing didn't pass 3-
1 • II 
Gorman was then asked what tools were used to influence the 
views of the legislature and the public. 
GORMAN: "All this was preceded by a couple of years of 
the Coalition's raising this whole issue to saliency 
within the general public." 
Wall had gotten the bill on the legislative agenda and 
eventually got Senate President Sammy Nunez, who represents a 
coastal district, to co-sponsor the bill in the Senate. 
There were other minor problems in the house. David Duke 
signed on as a cosponsor but was removed before the bill was 
voted on. The efforts by Republican state legislators to 
isolate Duke as an embarrassment deserve to be more widely 
known but are beyond the scope of this work. 
In the spring of 1989, after the Coalition had educated 
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the legislature and gotten extensive media coverage from the 
Times-Picayune (1989) and the (Baton Rouge) Advocate (1989) 
the bill passed. Later that year the wetlands trust fund part 
of the bill, which created a tax from mineral revenue, passed 
as a statewide constitutional amendment 3-1. Constitutional 
status made it hard for the state to use the money for a 
separate purpose. The money from the tax went to the state 
department of natural resources that frustrated the 
Coalition because the state's version of marsh management 
programs are not congruent with the Coalition plans in "Here 
Today, Gone, Tomorrow?'' The money is spent on projects that 
impound marsh areas and do not, according to John Day, build 
marsh. 
Simultaneously as the state action was happening the 
Coalition board also decided to educate the Louisiana 
delegation in Washington. Senator John Breaux introduced 
legislation that was essentially objective eighteen of "Here 
Today, Gone Tomorrow?" The National Coastal Wetlands 
Planning, Protection and Restoration Act of 1990 was signed 
into law by George Bush, in November 1990. The Act created a 
task force representing all federal agencies including the 
Corps and the state of Louisiana to develop a plan for 
coastal Louisiana. It raised wetland restoration and 
protection to a level equal to all other Corps values 
including navigation and flood control, and it provided a 
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budget increase to the Louisiana district office in excess of 
thirty five-million dollars. 
STATE CAPITAL INCENTIVES 
Ben Bagert, Eloise Wall and Randy Lanctote were members of the 
Coastal coalition. Before the Coalition began, Ben Bagert had 
been interested in coastal restoration as a policy issue he 
could build upon. Bagert got George Bush to write a letter 
concerning the Bush stand on "No Net Loss" of wetlands. 
Eloise Wall is an environmental advocate who entered the world 
of environmental politics because her daughter had an illness 
that she ascribed to pollution in the Baton Rouge area. Eloise 
Wall lives a few blocks from the legislature and is well known 
among the representatives. Bagert wants to be elected and 
advance the environmental cause, Lanctote represents the 
members of the Louisiana Wildlife Federation and needs to a 
advocate for his membership. Eloise Wall has her own 
organization: "Citizens for a Clean Environment." A coalition 
of common interests provided the rationale for a material 




I. THE CASE OF THE COALITION AND THEORIES OF INTEREST GROUPS 
The Coalition formed for reasons far beyond the individual 
desires of the members and represents the agendas of parent 
organizations applied skillfully in an ongoing incorporated 
entity. The Coalition is a specific type of organization --
a political organization created in the environmental 
movement to satisfy several organizational agendas. By 
facilitating the incentives available to the constituent 
members, the organization was formed and maintained by a 
small group of persons. Each organization: law, 
science/academic, grassroots religious or lobbyist had a 
strategic incentive to support the Coalition. 
As an individual case of political mobilization, the ability 
to generalize to other organizations, let alone the American 
political system is very limited. But as a theory building 
activity, the opportunity to generalize about the Coalition 
as a forming group beckons. The Coalition may represent a 
new type of national local organizational partnership that 
is developing as the environmental movement has "matured." 
As Bosso (1987) and Mitchell (1990) have argued, much of the 
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agenda of the environmental movement has been accepted by 
the public and now environmental organizations are having to 
become creative to continue. The Coalition is allied with 
many political actors in Washington, D.C. and Baton Rouge 
and continues today and their methods for staying together 
to sustain the coastal wetlands are working because they are 
still in business. 
The thesis is that building the Coalition organization is 
linked to benefits and strategies of a few entrepreneurs who 
represented parent organizations that promoted group 
alliance formation. The unit of analysis was broader than 
the characteristic of individual decision to join the group 
and represents people who have occupations that benefit from 
an alliance and maintain that alliance. The four categories 
of occupation: environmental law organizations, research 
scientists in the LSU academic setting, the organizations of 
Rob Gorman, and the Interfaith Stewardship efforts of the 
Schoefflers and the State Capital Network were largely 
mobilized by a small coterie. The Coalition did not happen 
because of good intentions or the existence of a problem. 
The problems, organizations interested in them and the 
interested people existed before the Coalition happened. 
Without careful goal directed acts of entrepreneurship it is 
doubtful that the organization or a similar organization 
would have occurred. 
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II. THE RESULTS AND EXCLUDING ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS 
David B. Truman's (1951) theory that an organization like 
the Coalition formed and continued because of likeness of 
function certainly does not hold. The Lawyers, the 
scientific community the grassroots religious groups, the 
fishermen, all had the problem of Coastal wetland decline. 
These people are however, are very different in terms of 
occupation, training, economic base and culture. In the end 
the group cannot stay together merely because the people in 
it are the same; they have little in common but the fact 
that they are in Louisiana and they do not like the 
declining wetlands. 
The organizations that the people represent are different as 
well. The Environmental Defense Fund, Tulane Law School and 
Osborne's law practice have functions in common 
but not with the ecologists at Louisiana State. Truman's 
view that likeness causes cohesion does not explain the 
Coalition. Neither does Truman's partial theory of 
disturbance. The disturbance of massive environmental change 
caused everyone to come together but they did not do so 
without encouragement from the lawyers. There may have been 
a general disturbance an ecological problem but people 
and organizations needed coordination. Someone like Michael 
Osborne and James Tripp had to find people whom they could 
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put together as an alliance. 
Olson's collective action dilemma was overcome for each 
group in the Coalition because of incentives of the members 
but mostly because of the incentives for parent 
organizations. The Environmental Defense Fund and the 
National Wildlife Federation had sought a presence in 
"National Treasure" locations throughout the seventies and 
eighties. It was a national material benefit that they were 
closely allied with a Louisiana organization. First, they 
could claim to national policy makers, particularly the 
Louisiana congressional delegation, that they were "in" 
Louisiana. Second, EDF in association with Ed Osann of the 
National Wildlife Federation, got Rob Gorman and others to 
come and testify in Washington, D.C. (Coalition Board 
Minutes, 1989). In addition, EDF could show national policy 
makers that the State of Louisiana would become involved 
with coastal land restoring and that the federal government 
would not bear the total cost (Part of the National Coastal 
Wetlands restoration Act was to get the state of Louisiana 
to assume some cost). The National Organizations found that 
it was a great benefit to litigate and organize in Louisiana 
that afforded them many benefits, purposive, material and 
solidary. 
The law practice of Mr. Osborne, already well established 
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and well known in New Orleans became the focal point of 
joint national, state and local action to improve the 
environment. Michael Osborne has been along with Oliver 
Houck and James Tripp an environmental enthusiast all his 
life. Michael Osborne canoed for years as a Sierra Club 
member in Arkansas and Louisiana and had almost a religious 
calling to save the environment. Oliver Houck is also a well 
known outdoorsman. The investi9ator found people all over 
·p.., 
Louisiana who had not been associated with the study who 
were aware of Houck's canoe trips down the Atchafalaya. 
The needs of grassroots groups were obvious because they 
were threatened physically and economically. People are 
slowly sinking because of wetland decline. Fishermen are 
running out of food because they are being denied access to 
fishing areas caused by the wetland decline. Catholic Social 
Services is running out of money because it has assumed the 
humanitarian task of helping the fishermen. And as Bishop 
Boudreaux says "the diocese is going under water ... 
(Boudreaux, 1989). 
The wetland ecologists saw their research being taken 
seriously by the public who now understand that there is a 
problem. The wetland ecologists understand that now that 
people understand more about the problem, the state is 
spending coastal restoration funds with scientific support 
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and program evaluation. 
The persons at the State Capital Network claim they 
successfully helped pass legislation, that they had 
something to do with national legislation being passed as 
well. These incentives were recognized by Michael Osborne, 
James Tripp, Oliver Houck, Rob Gorman as well as others. 
Together they fashioned a social network that continues to 
support the declining wetlands of coastal Louisiana. 
III. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE STUDY 
The Coalition organized as a complex act of 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship of high mindedness, 
solidary or fraternal rewards and specific material benefits 
that accrued to members from the negative effects of a 
declining coast. Mancur Olson said that people were 
motivated in limited ways by public goods. In a critique, 
Mitchell (1979) suggested, based on qualitative analysis of 
the big ten that people can be motivated by public bads. 
Public bads motivated the Coalition participants. 
Most all people interviewed in the study expressed sincere 
desire to see the wetlands of the Mississippi delta 
preserved. The resources of the Coalition members were 
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mobilized by selective employment of individual and 
strategic incentives recognized by a small group. 
To acquire more knowledge about group formation from this 
study an additional inquiry needs to be conducted. Other 
Louisiana groups such as the Lake Pontchartrain Basin 
Foundation as well as ad hoc groups like Concerned Crabbers 
and Common Claws in the Jeanerette, Louisiana, area need to 
be compared to the development of the Coalition. Another 
study of the Coalition's activities to compare the selective 
incentives also needs to be conducted in the years ahead to 
discover if the same patterns continue. 
The Coalition board minutes would also serve as an excellent 
quantitative study to understand maintenance incentives. The 
incentives could be mapped in the board minutes over time to 
see what incentives were the most important to the 
organization. A serious issue for the group that was not 
directly addressed in this study was Coalition funding 
levels. Seventy percent of the Coalitions budget came from 
east and west coast foundation grants that the Coalition 
applied for. James Tripp sits on the board of the 
Rockefeller Foundation where some early Coalition money came 
from. Michael Mileke, a former Coalition director who is not 
discussed in-depth in this work, worked to obtain grant 
funds that were substantial from w. Alton Jones ($200,000) 
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for three years, the Babcock foundation, the Hewlitt 
Foundation and others. A substantial part of Coalition 
maintenance funding coming from these sources was crucial. 
The grant getting function in the Coalition needs to be 
explored more. 
A possible strategy is mapping the foundation grant money 
and comparing it with the Coalition board minutes to see if 
specific pattern of individual and organizational activity 
corresponds with money received by the Coalition over time. 
Another issue that could be mapped from the board minutes 
would be attendance and the activities of the members. It is 
possible that attendance and level of commitment could be 
compared to Coalition activities even without looking at the 
money received to learn how the Coalition could be 
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214 N. Fir Street 
Jenks, Oklahoma 74037 
Dear Mr. Haney: 
April 6, 1993 
As discussed in our conversation it will be fine for you to 
use the map depicting the presettlement and current extent of 
forested wetlands in the Mississippi River Alluvial Plain. 
Because the article Dr. Shaffer mentioned has not yet been 
accepted by a journal for publication the best citation to use 
would be: 
Craig, N.J., L. ·creasman, D. Pashley, M. Swan, G. 
Shaffer, and D. Llewellyn. 1992. Restoration of 
the Mississippi River Alluvial Plain as a Functional 
Ecosystem. The Nature Conservancy of Louisiana, 
Baton Rouge, LA. 83pp. 
Best of luck on your dissertation. I would definitely 
appreciate a copy of your dissertation as it sounds like it 
will provide some excellent information for our work. 
sincerely, 
,J;.. I lL (V. u.tlmr,....,.__ 
Lisa Creasman 
Q printed on recycleff paper 
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f!lJwceo.e of ,Yto«/Jna- - /!ilu6<Jdaux 
.Y'.»f f/Jirr ;11,.r :.,,.;, 
.'l(:11111,n •. '.l'nlu".J1",,11n· 711.'/I,'/ 
F'chruary 13, 1989 
To the Priests 
Diocese of Houma-Thibodaux 
My dea.r UruthP.rs in <.:hrist.: 
I would like to encourage you to attend the meeting.of the 
Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Interf11.i th Stewardship Plan. As you well 
know, much of our Di.ocese is at risk of disappearing under water in 
the next fifty- years. We have lost much already-. 
We need not accept this. As a matter of fact, we are morally-
obligated, as stewards of God's gifts, to protect and restore our 
coastal wetlands. 
;,M.,,.,, (.f(lf/ 116.lf-77:III 
I will be attending and hope that you can Join me and our brothers 
and sisters from other denominations. 
Fraternally yours in 
_., 
I 
r··· .. :li~~:~ 
Bishop of Houma-Thibodaux 
WLB:yd 
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Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana 
8841 Highland Road, Suite C , Balon Rouge, LA 70808 • 504 / 766-0195 • Fax 504 / 766-0229 
1 August 1992 
·Mr.David Hanny 
9106A South Urbana 
Tulsa, OK 74137 
Dear David, 
Your visits to the Coalition In Baton Rouge this year have been dellghtrul--and your Interest In our 
work is most appreciated. llopefully, our nles and Interviews were of use of you in your 
research. We look forward lo fulure visils from you, and your "hands-on" trips to Baton Rouge 
and the coastal Louisiana area last January and this spring/summer were most pr<~ductive from our 
viewpoint. 
I'm about to start production of our next magazine, CoastWise , which will feature an article 
written about you by the Houma Courier. They have graciously given me permission to use the 
story they wrote about you. A companion article on our visit to the Honey Island Swamp Tour 
will also highlight the many things you learned about the Mississippi Delta. I do appreciate your 
assistance with the phc,tography on that "mission." 
The many Interviews you gave with our founders and "bailiwicks" should provide you with much 
material on our organization. The Coalition has accomplished so much in such as short time and 
much of the credit goes to our volunteer board members. 
The best of luck with your thesis. Please call if you need more Information. Perhaps next time 
south Louisiana's rains won't flood you out of your housing arrangements. 
Sincerely, · • 
~~~ 
SHEREE HOHN ELLtSON 
Administrator · 
Editor, CaastWise 
Tum the Tide on Welland loss by the Year 20001 
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